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JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken pursuant to U.C.A. Sec. 78-2-2(3)(j) 
and Section 4 of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from summary judgment entered against 
Steven K. Maxfield ("Maxfield"), Appellant, by the Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and in favor of Hi-
Country Estates Homeowners Association, a Utah corporation, 
Appellee. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Does the judgment entered by the Third District Court 
for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Scott Daniels presiding, in 
the case of Richard L. James, et al. v. John W. Davies, et al., 
Case No. C-81-8560, constitute res judicata and/or collateral 
estoppel and therefore bar Plaintiff's present cause of action? 
2. Is the doctrine of equitable servitude a proper legal 
basis for the entry of summary judgment against the Defendant in 
this case? 
3. Do the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of Hi-
Country Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. constitute a proper 
legal basis for Plaintiff to levy assessments against Defendant 
and other members of the Association? 
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4„ Was the granting of Plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment, with respect to its claim for attorneys fees, improper 
and prejudicial error? 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
This case is governed by Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure* 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about August 29, 1983, Plaintiff obtained a judgment 
in the Fifth Circuit Court for Salt Lake County, Sandy Depart-
ment, Small Claims Division, against Steven K. Maxfield for an 
annual homeowners assessment of $115.00 per year for upkeep of 
roads, utilities and general administration, along with court 
costs in the amount of $12.50 (R.8). Maxfield appealed this 
judgment to the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County 
on or about September 12, 1984 (R„4). Thereafter, Plaintiff and 
Defendant, along with other Defendants in similar small claims 
actions, entered into a stipulation for consolidation and related 
procedural matters in connection with this case. Pursuant to 
this stipulation, Maxfieldfs appeal along with the appeals of 
other small claims defendants were consolidated and assigned to 
the Honorable Timothy Hanson, Third District Court. The stipula-
tion was entered into by the parties on or about February 26, 
1986 (R.13, 14). On or about March 12, 1986, the Third District 
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Court entered an Order of consolidation whereby this case along 
with others was consolidated. Pursuant to this Order of con-
solidation, Plaintiff was required to file a new complaint 
setting forth its claims against the Defendants in the same 
manner as though this matter had been initially filed in the 
District Court, Prior to the entry of the Order of consolidati-
on, on or about February 25, 1986, Plaintiff filed its amended 
complaint with the District Court and sought (1) declaratory 
judgment, (2) account stated, (3) quantum meruit, and (4) open 
account (R.15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21). 
On or about April 3, 1986, Defendant Maxfield along with 
others filed his answer to the Plaintiff's amended complaint as 
well as a counterclaim and, among other things, alleged that 
pursuant to a judgment entered by the Honorable Scott Daniels of 
the Third District Court for Salt Lake County in a prior action 
entitled Richard James, et al. v. John W. Davies, C81-8560, 
claimed, among other things, that the claims contained in the 
Plaintiff's amended complaint were barred by the doctrines of res 
judicata and/or collateral estoppel based upon the ruling in the 
James v. Davies case (R.27, 28, 29, 30). 
On or about May 20, 1987, the Third District Court, the 
Honorable Timothy Hanson presiding, entered a scheduling order 
whereby the parties were required to submit uncontested and 
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contested statements of facts and further to brief the various 
legal issues raised by the pleadings of the parties (R.269, 270). 
On or about October 9, 1987, argument was had before the 
Court with regard to the various issues raised by the parties in 
their pleadings and, by way of Minute Entry dated October 9, 
1987, the Court stated, "If there is a basis for a levy the case 
is resolved and if not the matter will go to trial on a claim of 
unjust enrichment." (Ro380). In a Memorandum Decision dated 
November 17, 1987, the Third District Court ruled on the disputed 
legal issues and found that the case entitled Richard James, et 
ale v. John W. Davies, C81-8560, did not constitute collateral 
estoppel and/or res judicata and therefore the Plaintiff was not 
prohibited from levying assessments. The Court further ruled 
that the principle of "equitable servitude" applied to this 
action and entitled the Association to make reasonable assess-
ments (R.381, 382, 383, 384). 
On or about November 3, 1988, the Honorable Timothy Hanson 
entered summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff Association 
and against Maxfield in the principal amount of $1,177.99, along 
with costs of $12.50 for a total judgment of $1,190.49 together 
with legal interest and attorneys fees in the amount of $3,260.00 
owed jointly and severally among all of the defendants in this 
action (R.473, 474). 
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On or about November 14, 1988, Defendant Maxfield filed a 
Motion to Amend Judgment under Rule 59 and Motion for Relief from 
Judgment under Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
seeking to amend the judgment and for relief from this judgment. 
These motions were denied by the Court on March 24, 1989 (Re503, 
504, 514, 515). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Hi-Country Estates is a subdivision within Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, that was begun in 1969 or 1970 (R.152). In 
connection with the development of this project, the developer 
drafted protective covenants for Hi-Country Estates in June of 
1970 (R.152). These protective covenants placed certain restric-
tions on the types of uses for the land in the subdivision and 
further, the type and nature of structures which were allowed to 
be built on the property within the subdivision. The protective 
covenants for Hi-Country Estates and an amendment to these 
covenants were recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder on or about March 22, 1974 (R.145-152). 
On or about January 2, 1973, the developer of this project 
prepared a Certificate of Incorporation of the Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Association creating the Plaintiff Homeowners 
Association (R.205, 206). This Certificate of Incorporation was 
filed in the office of the Lt.Governor of the State of Utah on 
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May 17, 1973 (R.201). According to the Articles of Incorporation 
the Association was not organized for pecuniary profit but was 
created with the specific purpose to provide for the maintenance, 
upkeep and preservation of the streets, roads, and common area 
within the subdivision; to promote the health, safety and welfare 
of the residents within Hi-Country Estates; and to exercise all 
of the powers and privileges and to perform all of the duties and 
obligations of the Association as set forth in the protective 
covenants for Hi-Country Estates (R.202, 203). The Certificate 
of Incorporation authorizes the Association to: 
Fix, levy, collect and enforce payment by any 
lawful means, all charges or assessments pur-
suant to the terms of the protective covenants, 
as amended, and as provided in the Bylaws 
adopted by the Association; to pay all expenses 
in connection therewith and all office and 
other expenses incident to the conduct of the 
business of the Association, including all 
licenses, taxes or governmental charges levied 
or imposed against the property of the Associa-
tion (R.203)* 
According to the provisions of this Certificate of Incor-
poration: 
Every person or entity who is a record owner of 
a fee or undivided fee interest in any lot 
which is subject by covenants or record to 
assessment by the Association, including pur-
chasers under contract, shall be a member of 
the Association. . . . Membership shall be 
appurtenant to and may not be separated from 
ownership of any lot which is subject to as-
sessment by the Association. (R.201-206). 
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On or about April 6, 1973, an amendment to the protective 
covenants for Hi-Country Estates was prepared and executed by the 
developer of Hi-Country Estates, Inc. This amendment dealt with 
the creation of a Homeowners Association and further, the obliga-
tion of lot owners to pay his or her pro rata share of the cost 
to maintain the roads, streets and common areas within the Hi-
Country Estates subdivision (R.154, 155). The original 
restrictive covenants and the amendment to the restrictive 
covenants were recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder on March 22, 1974 (R.154, 155). 
On or about June 23, 1978, Defendant, Steven K. Maxfield, 
became an owner, along with his wife, of Lot 91 in the Hi-Country 
Estates subdivision. Maxfield obtained this ownership by receipt 
of a trustee's special warranty deed. Pursuant to the specific 
provisions of this trustee's special warranty deed, Defendant 
Maxfield took ownership of this property "subject to the protec-
tive covenants and the Articles of the Homeowners Association." 
(R.322). 
The Hi-Country Estates, Phase I Subdivision, when created, 
was intended to be an exclusive area preserving a country living 
lifestyle with lot size restricted to a five-acre minimum. 
Entrance to the subdivision is possible at only one point through 
an electronic security gate. Within the subdivision there are 
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over five miles of interior roads which have been improved and 
paved but remain private having never been dedicated to the 
County. In addition to these interior roads, there are miles of 
bridle paths for horseback riding. Salt Lake County provides no 
services to the subdivision other than police and fire protection 
and so, the homeowners must cooperatively maintain the roads, 
provide snow removal, maintain the fence and electronic gate, 
dispose of garbage and other refuse, ensure an adequate water 
supply and delivery system, and pay for legal fees incurred on 
projects of mutual benefit (R.277, 278, 465). On or about 
September 25, 1979, the original developer deeded the roads and 
common areas to the Plaintiff Homeowners Association (R.319). 
This present dispute arose when Defendant Maxfield refused 
to pay an annual assessment owed to Plaintiff Association for 
upkeep of the roads, utilities and general administration of the 
Association and which was due on July 1, 1983 (R.5). 
Prior to the commencement of this action, some of the pro-
perty owners in the Hi-Country Estates Subdivision, including 
Defendant Maxfield, became dissatisfied with the operation of the 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association and, particularly, the 
conduct of certain members of the Board of Directors. Because of 
this dissatisfaction, Defendant, along with other property 
owners, commenced a lawsuit in the Third District Court for Salt 
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Lake County, entitled Richard L. James, et al. v. John W. Davies, 
et al., Case No. C81-8560 (R.326-332). In this lawsuit, 
Defendant (Plaintiff therein, and his co-Plaintiffs), sought an 
order of the Third District Court granting the following relief: 
(a) a determination that the current directors of the Hi-Country 
Estates Homeowners Association were not lawfully elected or 
appointed; (b) a determination that the Association had no 
authority to enforce protective covenants of the Hi-Country 
Estates subdivision upon individual members of the Association; 
(c) an determination that the protective covenants and amendments 
thereto filed against the subdivision are unlawful and should be 
removed; (d) a determination that the Association had no 
authority to participate on behalf of its members in the hearings 
before the Salt Lake Planning Commission with respect to a zoning 
change of the subdivision; and (e) for money damages (R.326-332). 
The complaint filed by Defendant and his co-plaintiffs in 
the action of James v. Davies, supra, did not raise the issue of 
whether or not the Association could properly and lawfully assess 
its members for repair and maintenance of roads and common areas 
within the subdivision (R.326-332). 
After a trial on or about March 22, 1984, Judge Daniels 
entered the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a 
Judgment resolving the issues raised in the parties1 pleadings. 
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Pursuant to the Findings of Fact, Judge Daniels found the issues 
raised by the plaintiffs regarding irregularities or illegal 
election of directors of the Association were moot and therefore 
dismissed those claims. Judge Daniels further found that the 
purposes for which the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association 
was incorporated did not include the enforcement of protective 
covenants against individual landowners, however; the court found 
that the original protective covenants prepared on June 15, 1970 
were fully valid and enforceable. The Court found that the 
amendment to the protective covenants dated April 6, 1973 was not 
validly created and therefore determined it to be void and 
unenforceable because the purported grantor [developer] was not 
the equitable owner of a majority of the property within the 
subdivision and that the original covenants executed June 15, 
1970 prohibit amendment for a period of 25 years following their 
execution (R.342). The Court also found that the Articles of 
Incorporation of the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association 
did not include a specific grant of authority allowing the 
Association to appear at zoning hearings to represent the members 
of the Association (R.343). 
The Court did not make any ruling with regard to the appro-
priateness or legality of the Association's levying of assess-
ments against lot owners within the subdivision (R.339-349). 
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Judge Daniels did not determine that the Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Association was not lawfully constituted or was 
illegally formed (R.339-349). No appeal was taken by the parties 
to the Judgment and Findings of Judge Daniels (R.339-349). 
Subsequent to the ruling by Judge Daniels in this case, the 
Association continued to levy assessments and bring claims 
against delinquent lot owners in small claims court for the 
payment of assessments pursuant to the provisions of the Articles 
of Incorporation and Bylaws of the Association (R.5). 
On or about November 4, 1988, Judge Hanson entered the 
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment. 
According to the Findings of Fact, the Court found that the 
Plaintiff Association was a non-profit corporation comprised of 
owners of real property located in Hi-Country Estates Phase I 
subdivision in Salt Lake County, Utah. The Court found that 
pursuant to the Articles of Incorporation, the Association was 
organized for the purpose of the maintenance, upkeep and preser-
vation of the streets, roads and common areas within the 
Hi-Country Estates subdivision and was also formed to promote the 
health, safety and welfare of the residents within Hi-Country 
Estates (R.465). 
Judge Hanson further determined that every person or entity 
who is a record owner of a fee or undivided fee interest in any 
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lot which is subject by covenants or record to assessments by the 
Association shall be a member of the Association; and that 
membership in the Association was appurtenant to and may not be 
separated from the ownership of any lot which is subject to 
assessment by the Association. The Court determined that pur-
suant to the Articles of Incorporation of the Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Association, the Association had the duty and power to 
exercise all of the powers and privileges and 
to perform all of the duties and obligations of 
the Association as set forth in that certain 
protective covenants for Hi-Country Estates... 
(b) fix, levy, collect and enforce payment by 
any lawful means, all charges or assessments 
pursuant to the terms of the protective 
covenants, as amended, and as provided in the 
Bylaws adopted by the Association; to pay all 
expenses in connection therewith and all office 
and other expenses incident to the conduct of 
the business of the Association, including all 
licenses, taxes or governmental charges levied 
or imposed against the property of the Associa-
tion. (R.465, 466). 
Judge Hanson also found that pursuant to the Bylaws of the 
Association, the Association's Board of Directors had the duty to 
fix the amount of annual assessments against each lot and to 
foreclose any lien against any property for which assessments are 
not paid within thirty days after due date or to bring an action 
at law against the owner personally obligated to pay the same. 
The Court specifically found that pursuant to Article XI of these 
Bylaws, "No owner may waive or otherwise escape liability for the 
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assessment provided for him herein by non-use of the common area, 
roads or abandonment of his lot." (R.466, 467). The Court also 
found that Defendant Maxfield took his ownership interest in his 
property within the Hi-Country Estates subdivision "subject to 
the protective covenants and Articles of Incorporation of the 
Homeowners Association." (R. 467). 
Judge Hanson found that the issues in the James v. Davies, 
supra, case were not identical with the issues raised in this 
action; "The ability of the Plaintiff Association, to levy, 
lien, assess and/or collect annual assessments was not raised by 
any of the parties therein;" (R.468) and "The court in Davies 
was not asked nor did it consider whether lot owners would be 
liable for homeowners assessments or whether membership in the 
Association could be considered mandatory on some basis other 
than the amended protective covenants." (R.469). 
Based upon these Findings of Fact, Judge Hanson entered 
Conclusions of Law that Defendant Maxfield and his co-defendants, 
were mandatory members of the Plaintiff Association by virtue of 
their ownership of property in the subdivision and, further, 
could not unilaterally resign from this membership or escape 
liability for assessments (R.470). The Court specifically con-
cluded as a matter of law that the Plaintiff Association is 
"legally and lawfully entitled to levy and collect assessments 
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from lot owners for expenses incurred by the Plaintiff in dis-
charging its duties under the Articles, Bylaws and protective 
covenants." (R.470). The Court further concluded that the 
Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and original protective 
covenants of the Plaintiff Association "constitute a present and 
continuing equitable servitude upon the property owned by the 
Defendants. " (R.471). 
Based upon these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Judge Hanson entered his Judgment on or about November 3, 1988. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Findings of Fact entered by the Third District Court in 
this action are not clearly erroneous and therefore the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Plaintiff's claim is not barred by the doctrines of res 
judicata or collateral estoppel because the issues raised in the 
prior case of James v. Davies, supra, were different and Judge 
Daniels made no finding or decision with regard to the legality 
or appropriateness of the Association's power to levy assessments 
against property owners or members of the corporation. Further, 
Judge Daniels made no decision regarding the validity or legality 
of the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of the Hi-Country 
Estates Homeowners Association in the lawsuit known as James v. 
Davies. 
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Defendant Maxfield took ownership of his property within the 
Hi-Country Estates subdivision with notice of the restrictions 
placed upon his land by the protective covenants and Articles of 
Incorporation of the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association 
and therefore, these covenants and Articles constitute a valid 
and continuing equitable servitude upon his property allowing the 
Association to levy assessments against him and his property. 
The Articles of Incorporation and bylaws of the Hi-Country 
Estates Homeowners Association constitute a legal and binding 
contract between the Association and Defendant Maxfield. 
Therefore, the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association is 
legally entitled to levy assessments against Defendant Maxfield 
pursuant to the terms of the Articles, Bylaws and in connection 
with the Association's duties to provide for the maintenance, 
upkeep and preservation of the streets, roads and common areas 
within the subdivision and, further to promote the health, safety 
and welfare of the residents within the Hi-Country Estates sub-
division. 
Plaintiff Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association is 
legally entitled to be awarded attorneys fees against Defendant 
Maxfield by virtue of the contract which exists between the 
Plaintiff Association and Maxfield as created by the Articles of 
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Incorporation and Bylaws of the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Association. 
ARGUMENT 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT IS SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE AND THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES 
OF MATERIAL FACT WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE THE ENTRY 
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THEREFORE, THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE 
NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
In the Defendants' answer to the amended complaint in this 
action Defendants' raised as separate affirmative defenses the 
equitable doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. In 
order to determine which, or if either, of these doctrines is to 
be properly applied, one must focus on whether the second claim, 
demand or cause of action claimed to be barred is different from 
its alleged predecessor. 
In the case of Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 690 
(Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In order for res judicata to apply both suits 
must involve the same parties or their privies 
and also the same cause of action; and if it 
applies, it precludes the relitigation of all 
issues that could have been litigated as well 
as those that were litigated in the prior 
action ... (Emphasis added). 
Collateral estoppel on the other hand arises 
from a different cause of action and prevents 
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parties or their privies from relitigating 
facts and issues in a second suit that were 
fully litigated in the first suit. 
Although the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel are closely related, they are usually mutually 
exclusive* When the claim, demand or cause of action is the same 
in both cases, res judicata applies. But where the claim, demand 
or cause of action is different in the two cases, then collateral 
estoppel is applicable. Schaer v. State, by and through Utah 
Department, 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (1983). 
In the instant case, Defendant's defenses are based upon a 
prior proceeding, James, et al. v. Davies, et al., filed in 
November of 1981 in the Third District Court for Salt Lake 
County, Utah, Civil No. C81-8560. It is clear from a review of 
the amended complaint in that action that the claims raised in 
that case do not concern the same cause of action alleged by 
Plaintiff in this case. 
In James, et al. v. Davies, et al., supra, the Plaintiffs 
alleged certain irregularities in the election of certain 
directors and the appropriateness and legality of the enforcement 
of land use restrictions set out in the protective covenants of 
the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association by the Association 
and against lot owners. No issue was raised by the Plaintiffs' 
pleadings in the James v. Davies case regarding the appropriate-
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ness or authority of the Association to assess homeowners for 
road maintenance and other general administration expenses. 
In James v. Davies, the District Court looked only to the 
amended covenants as a source of mandatory membership because 
that was one of its provisions- However, mandatory membership 
was not an issue in that litigation. Rather, the Court 
determined that the original protective covenants recorded 
against the Hi-Country Estates subdivision were valid and 
enforceable according to their terms. On the other hand, the 
Court determined that the amendment to these covenants was 
invalid because the grantor was not the equity owner of a 
majority of the property; and because the original covenants 
prohibited amendment prior to 25 years after their execution. 
The protective covenants and amended protective covenants are not 
an issue in this case, nor are they raised or relied upon by the 
Plaintiffs for the authority to levy assessments against property 
owners within the subdivision. 
The only way res judicata could apply to this action would 
be if the court stretched the requirement that the prior action 
involve the same issues that "could or should have been raised 
therein," Krofcheck v. Downey State Bank, 580 P.2d 243 (Utah 
1978), Wheadon v. Pierson, 14 Utah.2d 45, 376 P.2d 946 (1962). 
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The purpose of the res judicata doctrine is to avoid relitigation 
of issues and actions which have in fact been previously 
litigated. At the time the James v. Davies case was filed, there 
was no issue as to the delinquency of assessments levied but 
unpaid. Therefore, the issue was never raised before the court 
and no ruling was made. Additionally, the court in James v. 
Davies did not deal with or rule upon the validity of the 
Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of the Association. 
Clearly, pursuant to the language of the Articles and Bylaws, the 
Association is required to levy and collect assessments from 
members of the organization. Because the issue of assessments 
and the validity of the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws was 
not raised in the James v. Davies action, the doctrine of res 
judicata cannot apply. 
With regard to the issue of collateral estoppel, a prior 
decision may be used against a party to preclude a further liti-
gation of the issue by him only when four questions are answered 
in the affirmative: (1) Was the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in 
question? (2) Was there a final judgment on the merits? (3) Was 
the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity 
with the party in the prior adjudication? (4) Was the issue in 
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the first case completely, fully and fairly litigated? White 
Pine Ranches v. Osguthorpe, 731 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1986). 
The first requirement; that the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication be identical with the one presented in the action in 
question, is not met here. The issue regarding the Association's 
authority and duty to levy assessments and sue to collect them 
against members of the Association and lot owners was never 
raised in the James v. Davies action. Rather, the issues raised 
in James v. Davies dealt with procedural matters involving the 
election of directors and the use of protective covenants by the 
Association to enforce alleged violation of the covenants. 
Clearly, the issues are not similar to those presented in this 
case. The only area of convergence between both actions is that 
Maxfield and the Association were among the 49 parties in the 
prior action. "This Court has previously stated that the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to issues that 
merely could have been tried in the prior case, but operates only 
to issues which were actually asserted and tried in that case." 
Schaer v. State, by and through Utah Department, supra, citing 
International Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515 (1979). 
As previously stated, there was no issue raised as to the 
appropriateness or legality of the Association's levy of assess-
ments and collection of them in the James v. Davies case. None 
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of the homeowners were delinquent in the payment of their assess-
ments at that time. Further, the Articles of Incorporation and 
Bylaws of the Association were not alleged to be improper or 
illegally created. Judge Daniels made no ruling with respect to 
the validity of the Articles and Bylaws which clearly give the 
Association the authority and duty to levy assessments against 
lot owners within the subdivision. Since the issue of assess-
ments was not before the court in James v. Davies, the court 
could not rule on that issue. For this reason the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel is not applicable to this case. 
POINT II 
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE SERVITUDE IS A PROPER 
LEGAL BASIS FOR THE ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE 
In Conclusion of Law No. 5, Judge Hanson determined, "The 
Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and original protective 
covenants of the Plaintiff Association constitute a present and 
continuing equitable servitude upon the property owned by the 
Defendants." (R.471). "The real basis for the enforcement of 
equitable servitude is the doctrine that one who takes land with 
notice of a restriction thereon cannot in equity and good 
conscience be permitted to violate that restriction." BYU 
Summary of Utah Real Property Law, Vol.1 (1978), Chapter 4, pg. 
136, Sec. 4.18. 
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In the case at bar, Defendant Maxfield took ownership of his 
property by way of a trustee's special warranty deed which 
specifically states that his ownership is "subject to the 
protective covenants and the Articles of the Homeowners 
Association," (Emphasis added), (R.322). Therefore, Maxfield 
had notice of the restrictions placed upon his land by the very 
language of his deed. The deed specifically refers to the pro-
tective covenants and the Articles of Incorporation of the 
Homeowners Association. Further, Maxfield took ownership of his 
property subsequent to the recording of these protective 
covenants the filing of the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws 
of the Association. 
Maxfield now apparently contends that the District Court 
intended to allow the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association 
to levy assessments against property owners within the sub-
division based upon the doctrines of unjust enrichment or quantum 
meruit and simply mislabeled these doctrines as equitable 
servitude. Clearly, that is not the case. Judge Hanson, in his 
Conclusions of Law, specifically states that the Articles of 
Incorporation, Bylaws and original protective covenants of the 
Association constitute a present and continuing equitable 
servitude upon the property owned by the defendants. The fact 
that in his oral ruling Judge Hanson referred to the defendants* 
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enjoyment of the use of common areas and other amenities does not 
support Maxfield's claim that the District Court intended to 
apply unjust enrichment or quantum meruit principles. 
Maxfield further contends that "the doctrine of equitable 
servitude is a restriction or limitation on the use of real 
property but by definition cannot create an association or allow 
the association to assess its members which must be created by 
another means." (Appellant's Brief, pg. 5). The Association has 
never contended that the doctrine of equitable servitude created 
the Association. Rather, the Association contends and has con-
tended throughout the action, that it was created by way of the 
Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws which were filed with the 
Lt. Governor's office in 1973. 
In Finding of Fact No. 1 Judge Hanson found: "Plaintiff is a 
non-profit corporation comprised of owners of real property 
located in the Hi-Country Estates Phase I subdivision located in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah." (R. 465). Judge Hanson 
further found in Finding of Fact No. 4, "The Articles of 
Incorporation and Bylaws for the Plaintiff corporation are dated 
January 30, 1972 and were recorded by the original developer of 
the subdivision on May 17, 1973. The parties have stipulated 
that the wording of the Articles and Bylaws are not disputed." 
(Emphasis added), (R.465). The Court specifically found in its 
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Findings of Fact that one of the purposes of the Plaintiff 
Association was to maintain and preserve the streets, roads and 
common areas within the subdivision. It is clear that according 
to the Articles of Incorporation, 
Every person or entity who is a record owner or 
a fee or undivided fee interest in any lot 
which is subject by covenants or record to 
assessment by the Association, including pur-
chasers under contract, shall be a member of 
the Association . . . Membership shall be 
appurtenant to and may not be separated from 
ownership of any lot which is subject to 
assessment by the Association." 
The Articles of Incorporation further charge the Association 
with a duty to 
exercise all of the powers and privileges and 
to perform all of the duties and obligations of 
the Association as set forth in that certain 
protective covenants for Hi-Country Estates. 
• • (b) Fix, levy, collect and enforce payment 
by any lawful means, all charges or assessments 
pursuant to the terms of the protective 
covenants, as amended, and as provided in the 
Bylaws adopted by the Association; . . . 
(R.466). 
The Bylaws of the Association charge the Association Board 
of Directors with certain duties. These duties include: 
(c) as more fully provided in the protective 
covenants, as amended, to: (1) fix the amount 
of the annual assessment against each lot at 
least thirty days in advance of each annual 
assessment; (2) send written notice of each 
assessment to every owner subject thereto at 
least thirty days in advance of each annual 
assessment; (3) foreclose the lien against any 
property for which assessments are not paid 
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within thirty days after the due date or to 
bring an action at law against the owner per-
sonally obligated to pay the same. 
The Bylaws of the Association further state in Article XI as 
follows: 
As more fully provided in the protective 
covenants, as amended, each member is obligated 
to pay to the Association annual and special 
assessments which are secured by a continuing 
lien upon the property against which the 
assessment is made. Any assessments which are 
not paid when due shall be delinquent. If the 
assessment is not paid within thirty days after 
the due date, the assessment shall bear 
interest from the date of delinquency at the 
rate of seven percent per annum and the 
Association may bring an action at law against 
the owner personally obligated to pay the same 
or foreclose the lien against the property, and 
interest, costs, and reasonable attorneys fees 
for any such action shall be added to the 
amount of such assessment. No owner may waive 
or otherwise escape liability for the 
assessment provided for herein by non-use of 
the common area, roads or abandonment of his 
lot. 
It is the Association's position that Defendant Maxfield 
ownership of his land with notice of the restrictions imposed 
upon the land by the protective covenants and the Articles of 
Incorporation of the Homeowners Association. The specific 
language of the Articles of Incorporation allow the Homeowners 
Association to levy assessments and collect these assessments 
from its members, the lot owners within the subdivision. In view 
of this restriction placed upon the Defendant's property, it was 
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not necessary for the District Court to reach the issue of unjust 
enrichment or quantum meruit« Rather, Judge Hanson specifically 
determined that the protective covenants and Articles of 
Incorporation constitute an equitable servitude on the property 
which Defendant Maxfield is subject to. Judge Hanson further 
found that the language of the Articles of Incorporation and the 
Bylaws of the Homeowners Association specifically allowed for the 
Association to levy assessments against the property owners. It 
is clearly stated in the Findings of Fact entered by Judge Hanson 
in this case, "The parties have stipulated that the wording of 
the Articles and Bylaws are not disputed." (R.465). 
"The right to urge enforcement of a servitude against the 
burdened land 'depends primarily on the covenants having been 
made for the benefit of other land, either retained by the 
grantor or part of a perceptible neighborhood scheme.'" Peterson 
v. Beekmere, Inc., 283 A.2d 911 (N.J. 1971), citing Paullett v. 
Stanley Stillwell and Sons, Inc., 170 A.2d at 56. 
In this case, the restrictions included in the protective 
covenants and the specific duties imposed upon the Homeowners 
Association by the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws were made 
for the benefit of all of the land within the Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Association. There is no question that the Hi-Country 
Estates subdivision was created as part of a perceptible 
26 
neighborhood scheme. There is no requirement that an equitable 
servitude be a covenant of the type which runs with the land. 
Rather, equity will sometimes enforce the obligation by an 
injunction against breach. The covenant or restrictions at issue 
herein are affirmative covenants requiring land owners to pay 
assessments in connection with the maintenance of roads, bridle 
paths and the general administration of the Homeowners 
Association of which they became members when they acquired their 
property. The issue then, is whether or not Defendant Maxfield 
took his property with notice of the restrictions placed thereon. 
As previously stated, there is no question that the deed which 
conveyed him his ownership of property within the Hi-Country 
Estates subdivision clearly stated that it was subject to the 
protective covenants and the Articles of the Homeowners 
Association. Therefore, the Articles of Incorporation constitute 
an equitable restriction on an owner's use of his land and the 
doctrine of equitable servitude is an appropriate basis for the 
District Court to enter summary judgment and specifically allow 
the Plaintiff Association to levy assessments against lot owners 
within the Hi-Country Estates subdivision. 
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POINT III 
THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION AND BYLAWS OF 
HI-COUNTRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. 
CONSTITUTE A PROPER LEGAL BASIS FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
TO LEVY ASSESSMENTS AGAINST DEFENDANT AND OTHER 
MEMBERS OF THE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION 
Plaintiff Association is a Utah non-profit corporation 
organized pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Non-Profit 
Corporation and Cooperative Association Act, U.C.A. Sec. 16-6-18, 
et seq« Pursuant to the provisions of U.C.A. Sec. 16-6-22, the 
Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of the Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Association constitute a proper legal basis for 
Plaintiff to levy assessments against the Defendant and other 
members of the Association. 
It is well established precedent that the 
bylaws of a corporation, together with the 
articles of incorporation, the statute under 
which it was incorporated, and the member's 
application, constitute a contract between the 
member and the corporation. When duly enacted, 
the bylaws are binding upon all members of the 
corporation or association who are presumed to 
know them and contract in reference to them. 
. . . The general rule is that a corporation 
has the power to enforce its bylaws by 
pecuniary penalties proportionate to the 
offense. Appeal of Two-Crow Ranch, Inc., 494 
P.2d 915, 919, 920 (Montana 1972). 
In the case at bar, the Plaintiff Association was organized 
pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Non-Profit Corporation and 
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Cooperative Act found at U.C.A. Sec. 16-6-18, et seq. Pursuant 
to the provisions of U.C.A. Sec. 16-6-19(6), a member of a 
corporation is defined as "one having membership rights in a 
corporation in accordance with the provisions of its articles of 
incorporation or bylaws." According to the Articles of 
Incorporation of the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association, 
Every person or entity who is a record owner of 
a fee or undivided fee interest in any lot 
which is subject by covenants or record to 
assessment by the Association, including pur-
chasers under contract, shall be a member of 
the Association. . . . Membership shall be 
appurtenant to and may not be separated from 
ownership of any lot which is subject to 
assessment by the Association. (R.303). 
Pursuant to Article II, Section 6 of the Bylaws of the 
Association, "Member shall mean and refer to those persons 
entitled to membership as provided in the protective covenants, 
Certificate of Incorporation, and these Bylaws." Therefore, 
according to the specific provisions of the Articles of 
Incorporation of the Association and its Bylaws, Maxfield is a 
member of the corporation. As has been previously stated, the 
Homeowners Association has the authority to: 
(b) fix, levy, collect and enforce payment by 
any lawful means, all charges or assessments 
pursuant to the terms of the protective 
covenants, as amended, and as provided in the 
Bylaws adopted by the Association; . . . 
Pursuant to Article XI of the Bylaws of the Association, 
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. . . each member is obligated to pay to the Association annual 
and special assessments which are secured by a continuing lien 
upon the property against which the assessment is made. Any 
assessments which are not paid when due shall be delinquent." 
Pursuant to U.C.A. Sec. 16-6-22, "Each non-profit 
corporation shall have power: "(2) to sue and be sued, complain 
and defend, in its corporate name." This general power statute 
states in Section (16) that each non-profit corporation shall 
also have the power: 
"to have and exercise all powers necessary or 
convenient to effect any or all of the purposes 
for which the corporation is organized, 
including the right to raise funds by such 
means or methods as the governing board may 
deem advisable, not inconsistent with law or 
its Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws." 
Clearly, the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation and 
the Bylaws of the Association specifically grant to the 
Association the authority to raise funds by means of levying 
assessments against members/property owners within the sub-
division. As has been previously stated, Maxfield is an owner of 
property within the subdivision. U.C.A. Sec. 16-6-26 in per-
tinent part states: "The articles of incorporation or the bylaws 
may contain provisions relating to the imposition of dues, 
assessments or other charges on members. . . " 
The rights of members of a private organization 
are governed by the articles of incorporation 
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and bylaws, which constitute a contract between 
the members and the organization, and among the 
members themselves• Rowland v. Union Hills 
Country Club, 757 P.2d 105, 108 (Ariz.App. 
1988). 
In First Federal Savings & Loan v. East & Mutual Electric, 
735 P.2d 1073 (Idaho App. 1987), the Idaho appellate court dis-
cussed the characteristics of a cooperative organization. At 
page 1075 the Court stated: 
Our analysis begins by noting the essential 
characteristics of a cooperative. It is 'an 
association which furnishes an economic service 
without entrepreneur profit and which is owned 
and controlled on a substantially equal basis 
by those for whom the association is extending 
service. . . . The governance of the 
cooperative and the rights of its members, 
ordinarily are set forth in the bylaws adopted 
by the board of directors. The bylaws are 
binding as a contract among the members. 
In Jorgenson Realty, Inc. v. Box, 701 P.2d 1256, 1257 
(Colo.App. 1985), the court stated: "The relationship between a 
voluntary association and its members is a contractual one and, 
by joining such an organization a member agrees to submit to its 
rules and regulations and assumes the obligations incident to 
membership." In the instant case, there is no question that 
Maxfield is a member of the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Association. His right and obligation to membership is clearly 
set out within the Articles of Incorporation of the Homeowners 
Association and the Bylaws and amendments thereto of the corpora-
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tion. Further, the language in his deed specifically states that 
the ownership of his property is subject to the Articles of the 
Homeowners Association. On this basis, and based upon the fore-
going authority, Maxfield has a contract with the Hi-Country 
Estates Homeowners Association and is bound to comply with the 
provisions of the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws which 
govern the operation of this organization. 
The specific language of the Articles of Incorporation and 
Bylaws require and allow the Association to levy assessments 
against property owners and their property for the purpose of 
"maintenance, upkeep and preservation of the streets, roads and 
common areas" within the subdivision and further, to promote "the 
health, safety and welfare of the residents within Hi-Country 
Estates• . •" The language of Section (b) of the Articles of 
Incorporation specifically require the Association to fix, levy, 
collect and enforce payment of all charges or assessments pur-
suant to the terms of the protective covenants and as provided in 
the Bylaws adopted by the Association. Again, as previously 
stated, pursuant to Article XI of the Bylaws, "each member is 
obligated to pay to the Association annual and special assess-
ments which are secured by a continuing lien upon the property 
against which the assessment is made." Based upon this specific 
language, Maxfield has no choice but to pay any and all reason-
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able assessments which are made against him and his property by 
the Association. The very nature of his contractual relationship 
with the Association by virtue of his ownership of property 
within the subdivision creates this right and obligation. 
We believe that the better view and the one 
which best serves the ends of justice is that 
the corporation should have the powers 
expressly given and those that are necessarily 
implied in order to enable it to efficiently 
and effectively carry on the purposes for which 
it is created. . . . Implied powers of a bank, 
or any corporation for that matter, are those 
incidental to and connected with the carrying 
into effect or accomplishing of the general 
purposes for the corporation, as expressed in 
the object clause of the articles. . . . 
Park v. Alta Dutch & Canal Company, 458 P.2d 
625, 628 (Utah 1969), citing Tracy Loan & Trust 
Company v. Merchant's Bank, et al., 167 P.2d 
353. 
There is no question that the purpose of the creation of the 
Homeowners Association was to maintain the common areas within 
the subdivision known as Hi-Country Estates. It is also clear 
that pursuant to the specific provisions of the Articles of 
Incorporation and Bylaws, this Association is entitled to levy 
assessments against its members so as to perform this necessary 
function of maintaining the common areas for all of the 
members/property owners within the Association. On this basis, 
the Articles of Incorporation and the Bylaws of the Hi-Country 
Estates Homeowners Association provide a proper legal basis for 
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the levying of assessments against Maxfield* On this basis, the 
decision of the District Court in this case should be upheld. 
POINT IV 
THE COURTfS GRANTING OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO ITS CLAIM FOR 
ATTORNEYS FEES WAS NOT IMPROPER OR PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
In his brief, Maxfield contends that there was no basis for 
an award of attorneys fees in favor of the Association and 
against him in the absence of either a contract or a statute, 
Maxfield correctly points out in his brief in citing Cluff v. 
Culmer, 556 P.2d 498, 499 (Utah 1976), "An award of contractually 
based attorneys fees must be based on a valid contract and 
incurred in the enforcement of expressed contractual covenants." 
As has been previously stated in this brief, the bylaws of a 
corporation, along with the articles of incorporation and the 
statutes under which the corporation was incorporated and, a 
member's application for membership in the corporation constitute 
a contract between the member and the corporation. Appeal of 
Two-Crow Ranch, Inc., supra. "A corporate charter is a dual 
contract - one between the state and the corporation, and the 
other between the corporation and its stockholders.
 c ." 
Jacobson v. Bachman, 401 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1965). In the 
instant case, the Articles of Incorporation of the Association 
specifically authorize the Association to: 
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(b) fix, levy, collect and enforce payment by 
any lawful means, all charges or assessments 
pursuant to the terms of the protective 
covenants, as amended, and as provided in the 
Bylaws adopted by the Association; to pay all 
expenses in connection therewith and all office 
and other expenses incident to the conduct of 
the business of the Association, including 
licenses, taxes or governmental charges levied 
or imposed against the property of the 
Association. 
The specific provisions of the Utah Non-Profit Corporation 
and Cooperative Act, U.C.A. Sec. 16-6-22(2) authorize this non-
profit corporation "to sue and be sued, complain and defend, in 
its corporate name." The general method for commencing a lawsuit 
is to retain counsel for the purpose of filing the action. The 
general power section of the Non-Profit Corporation Act specifi-
cally allows a non-profit corporation to commence litigation. 
Article XI of the Bylaws regarding assessments by the 
Association against a member's property states: 
As more fully provided in the protective 
covenants, as amended, each member is obligated 
to pay to the Association annual and special 
assessments which are secured by a continuing 
lien upon the property against which the 
assessment is made. . . . The Association may 
bring an action at law against the owner per-
sonally obligated to pay the same or foreclose 
the lien against the property, and interests, 
costs and reasonable attorneys fees of any such 
action shall be added to the amount of such 
assessment. (Emphasis added). 
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In view of the contractual nature between Maxfield and the 
Association, and the specific provisions of the Articles of 
Incorporation and the Bylaws of this Association, the Association 
is clearly entitled to collect attorneys fees in connection with 
actions filed by it for the purpose of collecting delinquent 
assessments owed it by the members of the Association, The 
contract between the Association and its members forms a proper 
legal basis for an award of attorneys fees against Maxfield, 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Third District Court in this action is 
supported by the evidence and the Court correctly found there to 
be no genuine issues of any material fact which would preclude 
the entry of summary judgment against Defendant Maxfield and in 
favor of Plaintiff. 
The decision in the James v. Davies, supra, case does not 
constitute res judicata or collateral estoppel which would bar 
the entry of judgment in this action by Judge Hanson. In the 
James v. Davies case, the issue of the Association's right to 
levy assessments against its members and the validity of the 
Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of the Association was not 
litigated or raised by the parties. Therefore, the bars of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel are not applicable. 
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In view of the fact that Maxfield took ownership of his 
property with notice that it was subject to the protective 
covenants and Articles of Incorporation of the Homeowners 
Association, the Articles, Bylaws and protective covenants of the 
Association constitute a valid equitable servitude upon the 
property and therefore provide a legal basis for the Association 
to levy assessments against Maxfield and other property owners. 
Further, by virtue of the specific language contained in the 
Articles of Incorporation, the Bylaws and the Utah Non-Profit 
Corporation and Cooperative Act, the Association is legally 
empowered and required to levy assessments against its membership 
so as to perform the objects and purposes of the corporation. 
Notwithstanding the equitable servitude which the Articles of 
Incorporation place upon the property of Maxfield and other 
homeowners, the Association is specifically empowered to levy 
assessments against homeowners. 
The Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of the Association 
create a contract between Maxfield and the Association. The 
specific provisions of the Bylaws allow the Association to 
collect attorneys fees in connection with actions filed by it to 
recover delinquent assessments from property owners. This con-
tract is a valid one between these parties and therefore con-
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stitutes a proper legal basis for the award of attorneys fees 
against Maxfieldo 
DATED this day of , 1989 • 
A. HOWARD LUNDGREN, 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
1) Rules and Statutes 
2) Constitutional Provisions 
3) Second Amended Verified Complaint in case of 
Richard L. James, et al. v. John W. Davies, et al., 
Third District Court Case No. C81-8560 
4) Court's Ruling in case of Richard L. James, et al. v. 
John W. Davies, et al., Case No. C81-8560 
5) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in case of 
Richard L. James, et al. v. John W. Davies, et al., 
C81-8560 
6) Judgment in case of Richard L. James, et al. v. 
John W. Davies, et al., C81-8560 
7) Certificate of Incorporation of Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Association 
8) Articles of Incorporation of Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Association 
9) Trustees Special Warranty Deed (Zions First National 
Bank as Grantor, Steven K. and Susan E. Maxfield as 
Grantees) dated June 23, 1978 
10) Memorandum Decision of Judge Timothy Hanson in lower 
court case of Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association 
Vo Maxfield, Third District Court Case No. C84-5500 
11) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in lower court 
case of Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association v. Maxfield 
C84-5500 
12) Judgment in lower court case of Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Association v. Maxfield, C84-5500 
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ADDENDUM 1 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
mi the defendant allowed to plead consistent 
mtkaar declared policy that in case of uncer-
iHtfy, default judgments should be set aside to 
Am trial on the merits. Locke v. Peterson, 3 
Ctah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955). 
Default judgment and writ of garnishment 
*«t properly set aside where trial court failed 
U tbttin jurisdiction over defendant because 
SMOQS was not timely issued. Fibreboard 
ftpr Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
m ?J2d 1005 (1970). 
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action, 
tly objected to date set for trial on the 
that their counsel had an already 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date, but due to fact that there were no law or 
motion days between time objection was filed 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re-
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham-
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 4S6 
(Utah 1979); KaU v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
shit Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
k Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra-
tes v. Sawaya, 1981 B Y U L. Rev. 937. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
8 1152 to 1213. 
CJ&. — 49 C J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. 
AXJt — Necessity of taking proof as to lia-
yir/ against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1070, 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus-
a l to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1271 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and 
Wring as to determination of amount of dam-
sf«, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Opening default or default judgment claimed 
to have been obtained because of attorney's 
mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
1255. 
Failure to give notice of application for de-
fault judgment where notice is required only 
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
Default judgments against the United States 
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment •» 92 to 134. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
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trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required* Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. $$ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 





—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Sufficiency. 





78-2-1. Number of justices — Term — Chief justice and 
associate chief justice — Selection and functions. 
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices. 
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed initially to serve until 
the first general election held more than three years after the effective date of 
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme 
Court is ten years and commences on the first Monday in January, next 
following the date of election. A justice whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed and qualified. 
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief justice from among 
the members of the court by a majority vote of all justices. The term of the 
office of chief justice is four years. The chief justice may not serve successive 
terms. The chief justice may resign from the office of chief justice without 
resigning from the Supreme Court. The chief justice may be removed from the 
office of chief justice by a majority vote of all justices of the Supreme Court. 
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30 days of a 
vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall act as chief justice until 
a chief justice is elected under this section. If the associate chief justice is 
unable or unwilling to act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as 
chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this section. 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of the Supreme 
Court, the chief justice has additional duties as provided by law. 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The term of office of 
the associate chief justice is two years. The associate chief justice may serve in 
that office no more than two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall 
be elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme Court and shall 
be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If the chief justice is absent 
or otherwise unable to serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief 
justice. The chief justice, where not inconsistent with law, may delegate re-
sponsibilities to the associate chief justice. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 'Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the 
Supp., 104-2-1; L. 1969, ch. 247, $ 1; 1986, ch. Supreme Court is ten years and until his suc-
47, 8 40; 1988, ch. 248, 5 4. cessor is appointed and approved in accordance 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- with Section 20-1-7.1" and, in Subsection (6), 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection substituted "determines" for "decides" at the 
(2), rewrote the second sentence which read end of the fourth sentence. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
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(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(0 taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L, of Subsection (4Mg); and made minor stylistic 
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, $ 303; 1988, changes. 
ch. 248, S 5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1. The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- 1989, added "and Forestry" at the end of Sub-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted "for- section (3)(e)(iii); rewrote Subsection (4)<a> 
mal adjudicative proceedings" for "cases" in which read "first degree and capital felony con-
Subsection (3)(e); added Subsection (3)(f); re- victions"; substituted "(f)" for "(i)" at the end of 
designated former Subsections (3)(f) to (3)(i)ac- Subsection (4Kg); and made minor stylistic 
cordingly; substituted "(i)" for "(h)" at the end changes. 
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16-6-13.1 to 16-6-13.12. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Sections 16-6-13.1 to 16-6-13.12 storing or permitting consumption of liquor on 
(L. 1955, ch. 25, §§ 2 to 4; 1969, ch. 37, §5 1 to premises, were repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 175, 
6, 8, 9; 1977, ch. 138, §§ 3 to 6; 1983, ch. 153. § 2. For present provisions regarding pnvate 
§§ 1 to 3; 1984, ch. 66, § 33), relating to clubs club liquor licenses, see § 32A-5-1 et seq. 
16-6-14 to 16-6-17. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Sections 16-6-14 to 16-6-17 (C.L. relating to entry into club rooms by police offi-
1917, §§ 898x1, 898x2, added by L. 1925, ch. cers, state store on premises, and penalty for 
111, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,18-6-14,18-6-15; violations, were repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 
L. 1979, ch. 59, §§ 2, 3; 1984, ch. 66, § 34), 175, § 2. 
ARTICLE 2 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
16-6-18. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Nonprofit Corpora-
tion and Co-operative Association Act." 
History: L. 1963, ch. 17, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Energy Law and Policy. — A A Primer of Utah Water Law: Part II, 6 J 
Primer of Utah Water Law, 5 J. Energy L. & Energy L. & Poi'y 1 (1985). 
Poi'y 165 (1984). 
16-6-19. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Corporation" or "domestic corporation" means a nonprofit corpora-
tion subject to the provisions of this chapter, except a foreign corporation. 
(2) "Foreign corporation" means a nonprofit corporation organized un-
ji i der laws other than Utah's. 
I, S3 {% (3) "Nonprofit corporation" means a corporation which does not distrib-
h §5 j i ute any part of its income to its members, trustees, officers, or a nonprofit 
l> f | j cooperative association. 
\ H *f (4) "Articles of incorporation" includes the original articles of incorpo-
f 5 , 1 ration and all amendments to them, including the articles of merger. 
g 3 (5) "Bylaws" means the code of rules adopted for the regulation or 
2 ,-X management of the affairs of the corporation irrespective of the names by 
§ J j which such rules are designated. 
2 j Z (6) "Member" means one having membership rights in a corporation in 
m
 J * accordance with the provisions of its articles of incorporation or bylaws. 
+ , * (7) "Governing board" means the group of persons vested with the 
management of the affairs of the corporation irrespective of the name by 
which such group is designated. 
15 
16-6-20 CORPORATIONS 
(8) "Trustee" means one of the group of persons on the governing board 
irrespective of the name by which such person is designated. 
(9) "Insolvent" means inability of a corporation to pay its debts as they 
become due in the usual course of its affairs. 
(10) "Cooperative association" means a corporation organized or exist-
ing under this chapter subject to the provisions of § 16-6-108. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 17, § 2; 1979, ch. 58, 
§ 1; 1986, ch. 178, 3 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
ment made stylistic changes in Subsections (1) 
through (10); substituted "laws other than 
Utah's" in Subsection (2) for "laws other than 
the laws of this state"; substituted "which does 
not distribute any part of its income" in Sub-
section (3) for "no part of the income of which is 
distributable"; substituted "to them, including 
16-6-20. Applicability. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 17, § 3. 
"Effective date of this act". — The term 
"effective date of this act/' referred to in this 
section, means July 1, 1963, the effective date 
of Laws 1963, Chapter 17. 
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this 
act," referred to in this section, means Laws 
1963, Chapter 17, which appears as §§ 16-6-18 
to 16-6-25, 16-6-26 to 16-6-99, and 16-6-100 to 
16-6-111. 
the articles of merger" at the end of Subsection 
(4) for "thereto, and include articles of merger"; 
deleted "or codes" and "name or" in Subsection 
(5); deleted Subsection (11) which read: "The 
words 'duplicate originals' mean identical cop-
ies of all documents, whether the copies are 
actual originals or photocopies, but bearing, 
however, original signatures"; and made minor 
changes in phraseology. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1961, ch. 28, 
§ 142 repealed §§ 16-8-1 to 16-8-4. Section 
16-8-5 was repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 178, 
§ 72. 
Cross-References. — Agricultural coopera-
tive associations, § 3-1-1 et seq. 
Consolidation of water companies and con-
servation districts, § 73-11-1 et seq. 
Corporations sole, § 16-7-1 et seq. 
(1) The provisions of this act relating to domestic corporations shall apply 
to: 
(a) all corporations organized hereunder; 
(b) all nonprofit corporations organized and existing under the laws of 
this state on the effective date of this act, including all corporations not 
for pecuniary profit organized under any of the provisions of Chapter 6 of 
Title 16, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which are repealed by this act; and 
(c) mutual irrigation, canal, ditch, reservoir and water companies and 
water users' associations organized and existing under the laws of this 
state on the effective date of this act. 
(2) The provisions of this act relating to foreign corporations shall apply to: 
(a) all foreign nonprofit corporations transacting business in this state 
for a purpose or purposes for which a corporation might be organized 
under this act; and 
(b) all foreign nonprofit corporations which qualified to do business in 
this state under the provisions of Chapter 8 of Title 16, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, which provisions were repealed by Chapter 28, Laws of Utah 
1961. 
This act shall not apply to corporations sole nor to domestic or foreign 
corporations governed by the Uniform Agricultural Co-operative Association 
Act. 
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16-6-21. Purposes. 
Corporations whose object is not pecuniary profit may be organized under 
this act for any lawful purpose or purposes, including, but without being 
limited to, any one or more of the following purposes: charitable; benevolent; 
eleemosynary; educational; civic; patriotic; political; religious; social; frater-
nal; literary; cultural; athletic; recreational; scientific; agricultural; horticul-
tural; animal husbandry; water development, diversion, storage, distribution 
or use; professional, commercial, industrial or trade association; co-operative 
association; and labor union or association; but organizations subject to any of 
the provisions of the insurance, banking, savings and loan or credit union 
laws of this state may not be organized under this act. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 17, § 4. Cross-References. — Corporate purposes 
Meaning of "this act". — See the note un- authorized under Utah Business Corporation 
der the same catchline following § 16-6-20. Act, § 16-10-3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Evidence of nonprofit nature of corpora- nature by parol evidence where the articles 
tion. were in harmony with those of a business cor-
Charitable or pecuniary nature of hospital poration and wholly inconsistent with those of 
association, sued for negligence, was to be de- a charitable organization. Gitzhoffen v. Sisters 
termined by its articles of incorporation; the of Holy Cross Hosp. Ass'n, 32 Utah 46, 88 P. 
association could not establish the charitable 691, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1161 (1906). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations C.J.S. — 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 47. 
§§ 30, 32, 33. Key Numbers. — Corporations •» 14. 
16-6-22. General powers. 
Each nonprofit corporation shall have power: 
(1) to have perpetual succession by its corporate name unless a limited 
period of duration is stated in its articles of incorporation. 
(2) to sue and be sued, complain and defend, in its corporate name. 
(3) to have a corporate seal which may be altered at pleasure, and to 
use the same by causing it, or a facsimile thereof, to be impressed or 
affixed or in any other manner reproduced. 
(4) to purchase, take, receive, lease, take by gift, devise or bequest, or 
otherwise acquire, own, hold, improve, use and otherwise deal in and with 
real or personal property, or any interest therein, wherever situated. 
(5) to sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, transfer and oth-
erwise dispose of all or any part of its property and assets. 
(6) to lend money to its employees other than its officers and trustees. 
(7) to purchase, take, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise acquire, own, 
hold, vote, use, employ, sell, mortgage, lend, pledge, or otherwise dispose 
of, and otherwise use and deal in and with, shares or other interests in, or 
obligations of, other domestic or foreign corporations, whether for profit 
or not for profit, associations, partnerships or individuals, or direct or 
indirect obligations of the United States, or of any other government, 
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state, territory, governmental district or municipality or of any instru-
mentality thereof. 
(8) to make contracts and incur liabilities, borrow money at such rates 
of interest as the corporation may determine, issue its notes, bonds, and 
other obligations, and secure any of its obligations by mortgage or pledge 
of all or any of its property, franchises and income. 
(9) to lend money for its corporate purposes, invest and reinvest its 
funds, and take and hold real and personal property as security for the 
payment of funds so loaned or invested. 
(10) to conduct its affairs, transact its business, carry on its operations, 
and have offices and exercise the powers granted by this act in any state, 
territory, district, or possession of the United States, or in any foreign 
country. 
(11) to elect or appoint officers and agents of the corporation, and de-
fine their duties and fix their compensation. 
(12) to make and alter bylaws, or resolutions, not inconsistent with its 
articles of incorporation or with the laws of this state, for the administra-
tion and regulation of the affairs of the corporation. 
(13) unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, to make 
donations for the public welfare or for religious, charitable, scientific or 
educational purposes; and in time of war to make donations in aid of war 
activities. 
(14) to indemnify any trustee or officer or former trustee or officer of 
the corporation, or any person who may have served at its request as a 
trustee, director or officer of another corporation, whether for profit or not 
for profit, against expenses actually and necessarily incurred by him in 
connection with the defense of any action, suit or proceeding in which he 
is made a party by reason of being or having been such trustee, director or 
officer, except in relation to matters as to which he shall be adjudged in 
such action, suit or proceeding to be liable for negligence or misconduct in 
the performance of duty; but such indemnification shall not be deemed 
exclusive of any other rights to which such trustee, director or officer may 
be entitled, under any bylaw, agreement, vote of the governing board or 
members or otherwise. 
(15) to voluntarily dissolve and distribute its assets in accordance with 
the provisions of this act. 
(16) to have and exercise all powers necessary or convenient to effect 
any or all of the purposes for which the corporation is organized, includ-
ing the right to raise funds by such means or methods as the governing 
board may deem advisable, not inconsistent with law or its articles of 
incorporation or bylaws. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 17, $ 5. 
Meaning of "this act". — See the note un-
der the same catchline following § 16-6-20. 
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(3) The registered agent of a corporation may resign by filing an origi-
nal written notice and one copy with the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code. The division shall mail a copy of the notice of resigna-
tion to the corporation at its principal office in the state or country under 
the laws of which it is incorporated. The appointment of the registered 
agent ends 30 days after receipt of the notice by the Division of Corpora-
tions and Commercial Code. 
History: C. 1953, 16-6-25.2, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 178, ft 5. 
16-6-25.3. Service of process on registered agent or direc-
tor of division. 
(1) The registered agent who is appointed by a nonprofit corporation is an 
agent of the nonprofit corporation upon whom any process, notice, or demand 
required or permitted by law to be served upon the corporation may be served. 
If a corporation fails to appoint or maintain a registered agent in this state, 
or if its registered agent cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the 
registered office, the director of the Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code is an agent of the corporation upon whom any process, notice, or demand 
may be served. The director of the Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code shall be served with any process, notice, or demand by delivering to the 
director, or with any clerk having charge of the corporation unit of the divi-
sion, together with copies of the process, notice, or demand. If any process, 
notice, or demand is served on the director of the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code, he shall immediately forward a copy of it by registered 
mail to the corporation at its registered office. Any return of service on the 
director of the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code is due not less 
than 30 days after service on the director. 
The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall keep a record of 
all processes, notices, and demands served on the director under this section. 
The division shall record the time of each service and the director's action on 
the service. 
(2) This section does not limit or effect the right to serve any process, no-
tice, or demand required or permitted by law upon a corporation in any other 
manner permitted by law. 
History: C. 1953, 16-6-25.3, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 178, § 6. 
16-6-26. Members — Classes — Provisions of articles of 
incorporation or bylaws — Liability. 
A nonprofit corporation may have one or more classes of members, or may 
have no members. If the corporation has one or more classes of members, the 
designation of such class or classes, the manner of election or appointment, 
the qualifications and rights of the members of each class and any provisions 
for termination or forfeiture of membership shall be set forth in the articles of 
incorporation or the bylaws. The articles of incorporation or the bylaws may 
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contain provisions relating to the imposition of dues, assessments or other 
charges on members and provisions restricting the transfer of memberships. 
Members are not individually or personally liable for the debts or obliga-
tions of the corporation. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 17, 9 9. 
16-6-27. Meetings of members — Annual and special meet-
ings-
Meetings of members may be held at such place, within or without this 
state, as may be determined from time to time by the governing board or as 
may be provided in the bylaws. In the absence of any such determination or 
provision all meetings shall be held at the principal office of the corporation in 
this state. 
An annual meeting of the members shall be held at such time as may be 
provided in the articles of incorporation or the bylaws. Failure to hold the 
annual meeting at the designated time shall not work a forfeiture or dissolu-
tion of the corporation. If an annual meeting is not held within three months 
after the time provided in the articles of incorporation or bylaws, an annual 
meeting may be called by any ten members having voting rights or by mem-
bers having the right to cast ten per cent of the votes entitled to be cast at 
such meeting, whichever is greater. 
Special meetings of the members may be called by the principal officer of 
the corporation or by the governing board. Special meetings of the members 
may also be called by such other officers or persons or number or proportion of 
members as may be provided in the articles of incorporation or the bylaws. In 
the absence of a provision fixing the number or proportion of members enti-
tled to call a meeting, a special meeting of members may be called by mem-
bers having the right to cast one-third of the votes entitled to be cast at such 
meeting. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 17, * 10. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. —18A Am. Jur. 2d Corpora- Key Numbers. — Corporations «» 191 to 
tions §§ 948, 949, 953 to 957; 18B Am. Jur. 2d 194. 
Corporations §§ 1365 to 1367. 
C.J.S. — 18 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 539 to 
543. 
16-6-28. Meetings of members — Notice. 
Unless some other method of giving notice is prescribed by the articles of 
incorporation or the bylaws, written or printed notice stating the place, day 
and hour of all meetings of members and, in case of a special meeting, the 
purpose or purposes for which the meeting is called, shall be delivered not less 
than ten days before the date of the meeting, either personally or by mail, by 
or at the direction of any of the officers of the corporation, or the officers or 
persons calling the meeting, to each member entitled to vote at such meeting. 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH ART. VIII , § 4 
Mandamus as remedy to compel as- torney or counsel as disqualifying judge, 
sertedly disqualified judge to recuse him- 72 A. L. R. 2d 443. 
self or to certify his disqualification, 45 Relationship of judge to one who is 
A„ L. R. 2d 1)37. par ty in an official or representative ca-
Numher of changes of judges, s ta tu te pacity as disqualification, 10 A. L. R. 2d 
limiting, 104 A. L. R. 1494. 1307. 
Par ty ' s r ight , in course of l i t igation, Relationship to a t torney as disqualify-
to challenge t i t le or authori ty of substi- ing judge, 50 A. L. R. 2d 143. 
tuto judge, 144 A. L. R. 1214. Residence or ownership of property in 
Tower of successor judge tak ing office city or other political subdivision which 
during term time to vacate, etc., judgment is par ty to or interested in action as dis-
entered by his predecessor, 11 A. L. R. qualifying judge, 33 A. L. R. 1322. 
2d 1117. Right of par ty , in course of l i t igation, 
Power of successor or subst i tuted judge, to challenge ti t le or authori ty of judge 
in civil ense, to render decision or enter or of person act ing as judge, 144 A. L. 
judgment on testimony heard by predeces- R. 1207. 
sor, 22 A. L. R. 3d 922. Successor judge, authori ty in dealing 
Practice of law, propriety and permis- with unfinished business of previous judge, 
sibility of judge engaging in, 89 A. L. R. 54 A. L. R. 952, 58 A. L. R. 848. 
2d 880. Time for assert ing disqualification, 73 
Prior representation or act ivi ty as at- A. L. R. 2d 1238. 
Sec. 3. [Selection of judges—Method of—Basis of selection.] 
Judges of the Supreme Court and district courts shall be selected for 
such terms and in such manner as shall be provided by law, provided, 
however, that selection shall be based solely upon consideration of fitness 
for office without regard to any partisan political considerations and 
free from influence of any person whomsoever, and provided further that 
the met hod of electing such judges in effect when this amendment is 
adopted shall he followed until changed by law. (As amended November 
7,1944, effective January 1, 1945.) 
Compiler's Notes. qualifications of the justices and substi-
The .'intendment of 1943 was proposed by tutcd therefor the method of selection and 
Senate Jo in t Resolution No. 2, Laws 1943, election, 
p. 188, and was adopted a t the general 
election November 7, 1044, and became Cross-Reference. 
effectivu January 1, 1045. The amendment Election of Supreme Court and district 
deleted the provisions relative to the court judges, 20-1-7.1 et seq. 
Sec. 4. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court—Terms.] 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs 
of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus. 
Each of the justices shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, to 
any part of the State, upon petition by or on behalf of any person held in 
actual custody, and may make such writs returnable before himself 
or the Supreme Court or before any district court or judge thereof in 
the State. In other cases the Supreme Court sliall have appellate juris-
diction only, and power to issue writs necessary and proper for the 
exercise of that jurisdiction. The Supreme Court shall hold at least three 
terms every year and shall sit at the capital of the State. 
Cross-Reference.
 i s a p p e U a t e only. S ta te v. Kinder , 14 U. 




 U n ( ] c r t h i a g c c t i o n t h c S u p r o r T 1 0 C o u r t f 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and not a justice thereof, is authorized to 
with the exception of extraordinary writs, issue a writ of certiorari , and a s ta tu te 
255 
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Civil Mo. C-81-BSf.'J 
COME NOW, the Plaintiffs and for causes of action again: 
the Defendants assert, allege and complain as follows: 
1. The Plaintiffs are residents of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
2. The Defendants, John W. Davies, Robert Millard, 
John C. Thomas, and Joanne Abplanalp, are residents of Salt Lak»-» 
County, State of Utah. 
3. The Defendant, Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Association, is a non-profit corporation formed under the laws of 
EXHIBITJ O)032€ 
the State of Utah with its principal place of business in the 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
4. Each of the Plaintiffs i a a member oC the nufuiul.ini , 
Hi-Countiy Homeowners Association. 
FIRST CAUSE Or' ACTION 
r). Plaintiffs* incorporate herein by reference the 
allegations made in paragraphs I, 2, 3, and 4 of this Amended 
Verified Complaint. 
b. On October 15, 1980 , a special meeting was called ui 
the members of the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association for 
the purpose of electing a new Director. 
7. After said meeting, Robert Millard was appointed an 
the now director. 
\i. Hubert Millard was not duly eieered at said meeting 
on October 15, 1980 by reason of the fact that absentee ballots h.i. 
been illegally used. 
(). Robert Millard is currently servimj as a Director 
the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association and has no le^ jal 
authority tu do so. 
10. Robert Millard should be enjoined from takimj .my 
further aetion as a Director of the Hi-County Estates Homeowner'*. 
Aii.-jociat JUII , and unless he is so enjoined, the Plaintiffs will 
sutler J mined I ate and irreparable injury. 
SECOND CAUSE OK ACT ION 
lie Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reterence the 
al lecjar ion:, made in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this Amended 
Verified Complaint. 
12. On February 28, 1981, an annual meeting of the 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association was held for the purpose 
of electinq three new directors. 
U , As a result of said meeting, John W. Davies, Robert. 
Millard and John C. Thomas were installed as Directors of the 
Hi-Country Rotates Homeowners Association and are currently serving 
in that capacity. 
14. The above Defendants were not legally elected as th 
new directors for the reason that Richard L. James, the lawful 
holder of seven (7) proxy votes, one (I) given to him by John 
Beagley and six- (6) given to him by Larry Beaglcy, was denied the 
use of the proxy votes. 
15. Had Richard L. James been allowed to use said sovon 
(7) proxy votes, the Defendants would not have had sufficient vote., 
to be elected as Directors. 
16. The above Defendants were n»»t legally elected tor the 
reason that, many ot the proxy votes cant in tuvor oi said 
Defendants had not been legally obtained »nd voted. 
17. But for the use of said illegal proxy votes cast in 
favor of the Defendants, the Defendant.'.; would not have had 
sufficient votes to be elected as Director-. 
1H. The above Dulendants were not b-»j.ill> elected I u \ h-
reason tli.it the By-Laws of the Hi-County Estates Homeowner*; 
Aijsiociat ion prohibit a Director from servmq concurrent terms, 
which the Defendants are now doing. 
19. John W. D a v i e s , Robert Mill.ud, and John C. Th iina . 
should be enjoined trom taking any further drtLon as Director-, oi 
the Hi-County Est.it.es homeowners Associat Lon, and unless they ,:r« 
so enjoined, the IMaintiffs will suffer immediate and irregparubl 
i n i u ry . 
THI K D CAUSE OF ACT l±JN 
2 0. T he Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference the 
allegations made in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this Amended 

































21. The Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association has 
taken legal action to enforce certain pLOtectivt? covenants ol the 
ni-Countiy Estates Subdivision upon individual members of the 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association. 
22. The Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association ha^ 
expended the funds of the Association in taking said legal action. 
2J. The Ui-Country Estates Homeowners Association WHS 
tormed for the express purpose of maintaining and providinq tot M. 
common areas*, Including roads and streets. 
24, The Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association has no 
authority to entorce the protective covenants of the subdivision 
against individual members. 
2b. Said actions to enforce the restrictive covenants it 
ultia vires and the Hi-Country Estates Homeownera Associatioi 
should ho i ob trained from taken any further action to enfofo s<41 i 
covenants against the individual members, and unless the 
Association is so restrained, the Plaintitfs will suffer immedi it 
and irreparable m-jury. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACT TON 
26. The Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference th • 
allegations made in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this Amended 
Verified Complaint. 
27. There presently exists on record certain pr)te*tLv» 
covenants against the property contained in the Hi-Country F.tat 
Subdiv l4. ion. 
28. Said protective covenants ire illegal <ai\6 voi 1 
because they weie not properly enacted and l^ iMii'je they .ir** 'ivi*. 
J9. There presently exists on record an amendment in th 
protective covenants mentioned above. 
JO. Said amendment is illegal and void because it wa* not 
properly enacted pursuant to the terms ol the original protective 


































FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
3 7o The Plaintiffs incorporate heroin by reference the 
a I Legations made in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this Amended 
Veiitied Complaint. 
JB. An application has been filed with t ho Salt hake 
Planning Commission seeking a zoning change for the Hi-Country 
Etitutob Subdivision for which application healings have been 
scheduled in the near future. 
t<). The tli-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc i it ion i\\d 
current Director*? intend in the future to participate in
 aaul 
hearings. 
40. Such participation by the U\ -Country Estates 
Homesownors Association it> frnpressly prohibited by its cflrrn ,<\ 
of incorporation. Utiles* the Hi-Country Estates llomeowru r t. 
Association and its current Directors are prohibited from 
participating in the scheduled hearings before the Salt Lake 
Planning Commission, the members of the Association W L I L ..uti"r 
immediate and irreparable harm. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTTON 
4J. The Plaintiffs incorporate heroin, by refer ucv_ , th 
allegations made in Paragraphs 1 through 2CJ of this Amend' d 
Vi. r i t i ««d Comp 1 a inf . 
4i. The Defendants, John W. [ M V U , , Rcbert Millaid if, 1 
John C. Thomas have illegally and wrongfully aeted as Dire<t *» . .r 
I he Mi-Count i y Estates Homeowners Asportation Ly attempting to 
tntoice pi ot i-iM ive covenants against memb^ i , »\ the AriScX'uit i m. 
44. The Defendants, John W. Davies, Robert Mill.nd an I 
John C. Thomas have illegally acted as Directors of the Hi-Countr/ 
Estates Homeowner^ Association by expending funds of the 
Association in attempting to enforce p r o l e * tve covenants agun.t. 
i t *> membei », . 
i>U)G33v. 
4r». The Defendants, John W. Davies, Kobert Millard, 
and Joanne Abplanalp have illegally and wrongfully acted as 
Directors ot" the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association in their 
conduct of the elections which took place.* on October 15, 19H0 , A\M\ 
February 2H, 198 1, as set forth above. 
46. The Plaintiffs have made a dtMnind on the l)u t endnnt ••• 
to redress the wrongs complained of herein, but the Defendant:; 
failed and refused, and still fail and refuse, to comply with the 
Plaintiffs' demand. 
47. By reason of the unlawful acts ot* the Defendants 
John W. Davies, Robert Millard, and Joanne Abplknaip the Defendant; 
Hi-Country Kstates Homeowners Association ha:? been damaged in the 
sum of TIIINTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($30,000.00) 
4tt. The Plaintiffs havo no ad«nu»ra remedy at law. 
WHEiUSFOHK, Plaintiffs pray foi ]udqment. agiinst the 
Defendants a is follows: 
1. Pursuant to Plaintiffu' Fiist «jnd Second Causes -»f 
Action, tor an Order determining that the current Directors oi » he 
Hi - C< mnl. r v' Instates Homeowners Association wcru not- 1 awl ally el,-a, ! 
or appo inted and enjoining such Directors from (akin*) any t'ui'i II-M 
actions OP. he ha It <)f the Association. 
2. Pursuant to the Plaintiffs' Third Cause of AM ion, 
for an Order determining that the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Associat ion has no authority to enforce protective covenant:. >t » Ji-
ll i-Count, r / Kstates Subdivision upon individual numbers of the 
Association tn^\ enjoining the Association ; rom any further 
ehrorcemont or expenditure of monies therei sr. 
<. Pursuant to .the Plaintiffs' fourth e'ause ot Act i . -r. , 
lor an Older determining that the protective covenants a\n\ 
amendments thereto filed against the Hi-Countr / Kstates Subdivision 
are unlawful <i\v\ shall be removed. 
4. Pursuant to the Plaintiffs' F i i'rh Cause of Action, 

































Assocaition has no authority to participate on behalf of its 
members in the hearings before the Salt Lake Planning Commission 
with respect to a zoning change for the Hi-Country Estates 
Subdivision and for an Order enjoining any auch actions by the 
Assocaition or its Directors, 
5. Pursuant to the Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action, 
for Judgment in favor of the Defendant, Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Association, and against the Defendants, John W. Davids, 
Robert Millard, John C. Thomas, and Joanne Abplanalp in the iuim i.f 
THIRTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($30,000.00). 
6. For attorney's fees, costs of court and for such 
further relief as to the Court appears just ami equitable in th 
premises c 
DATED this /jg&* day of November, lf>8i 
A J 
HARDING k HARDING 
ATTORNEYS I T LAW 
fat* < 'zSZLu 2:^2^v. 
M. HARD TNG 
fTORNKY FOR PLAINT! 
P.O. Box 12b 



























IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKH COUNTY 
STIVI'E o r in MI 
• * * • « 
RICHARD Lo JAMES, ET. AL., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN W. DAVIES, ET. AL.. 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C-81-8560 
COURT'S RULING 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 17th day of February, 
1984, in the above-entitled court at Salt Lake City, Utah, 
commencing at the hour of 9:00 a.m. the above-entitled 
matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Scott Daniels 
sitting without a jury, and the following proceedings were 
had. 
APPSARANCES; 
For the Plaintiffs 
For the Defendants 
R. Clark Arnold. Esq. 
Lowe & Arnold 
Valley Tower, Fourth Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Con Kostopulos, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
1095 East 2100 South, Suite 235 



























R_-R i?...C. •'•; Ji J\ T N o .5 
il-.'xcvrpi of pro-ixcii rn.:ji) 
Till. C UlcT: Thi.s i.-: tin: raa..' of Kn-horJ L. .Ja/-e.< 
and others verses John W. Davics and others, C-81-8560. 
First cause of action related to the election and 
it was dismissed. 
The second cause of action related to the election 
of officers, and it was also dismissed. 
The third cause of action relates to authority to 
enforce the covenants. 
As I have read the covenants in light of the 
testimony that's been presented, I'm of the opinion that the 
type of homeownership that the Homeowners Association has 
is not a type of homeownership or land ownership contemplated 
in the restrictive covenants and rule that the Homeowners 
Association has no authority to enforce the restrictive 
covenants. 
On the fourth cause of action, the first portion 
relating to the covenants themselves was dismissed. 
The second relating to the amendment, I think I'm 
compelled to rule that the amendment was not properly enacted. 
First of all I just can't really read the restrictive covenants 
j themselves in such a way as to allow amendment before the 
expiration of that term in 1995. But even if there were 
som« Metnod to do that, I think it requires the consent oF 
the equitable owners of the property. So on either ground 




























The fifth cause of action relating to the ability 
of the Homeowners Association to appeal and pror.ent. its vu us i 
the zoning actions, I ' vo road the cases cited anJ the rule? 
cited, and I'm of the opinion that based upon the language in 
the articles of incorporation, the Homeowners Association 
does not have the right to hear zoning hearings. 
On the sixth cause of action which relates to ultra 
vires as well as I find as a matter of fact that there were 
no funds used of the Homeowners Association used to prosecute 
actions to enforce th# covenants• Therefore, I rule for the 
Defendants on that particular claim. 
The third part of the sixth cause of action relating 
to the elections is moot and is dismissed based upon the 
fact that the first cause of actions were dismissed because 
of the election question I find to be moot. 
I do find that the directors acted in an ultra vires 
matter in attempting to enforce the restrictive covenants. 
And I suppose the issue of Judgement they can't do that, but 
I really find no damages in that respect since they didn't 
use any Homeowner. Association funds. 
I think that the action was prosecuted on both sides 
in good faith and both sides honestly felt they had a 
legitimate position to take and do not feel that attorney fees 
are appropriately awarded to either side in this case. And 
Jreally since I ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs on some of 
the issues and in favor for the defendants on others, it's 
difficult 10 5se how there's a prevalent patty, and therefore, 




























Now, did 1 cover everythino or did I Jeavc something 
out? 
MR. ARNOLD: No. Your Mono). just clarifying on the 
judgement. The judgement would be that the permanent restraining 
order would issue against enforcement of the covenants? 
THE COURT: I think that's probably appropriate. 
Any problem with the form of that procedure? 
MR. KOSTOPULOS: No, Your Honor, 
.j The only additional question I might ask, the Court 
may decline to respond, it being not perhaps properly before 
the Court at the present time is this: In as much as the Court] 
has ruled that the amendment to the covenants is invalid in 
as far as it being improperly enacted and in as much as the 
amendment to the covenants is the source of mandatory membershi[p 
in the association itself, and in as much as we are coming 
up very quickly to the February 28th anual meeting of the 
association, I wonder if the Court would address the issue 
of whether or not that meeting should go forth or if there's 
any point in doing anything with it or whether the association 
should simply be dissolved at this point?. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm of the opinion that the amend-
ment was improperly enacted which seems to be the source of 
mandatory participation in the association. I don't see any 
reason why the association can't continue to hold its meetings 
do what it wants to do, Ntdybn SV6h tell people if they c.n't 
be members, they can't drive on the roads or something. But 
as 1 read the documents, I just see no -- I just cannot come 
to the conclusion that that amendment was validly enacted. ^ 
»r»oc 
And I don't know if I can tell you what the next step i ^ I 
realJy don't think it was — 
MR. ARNOLD: I will prepare the findings* 
THE COURT; Would you submit those to Mrc Kostopulos? 
MR. ARNOLD: I will, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right* Again, I appreciate t;*e 
way it was handled. It was a very well tried case and the 
areas that were submitted were presented very well. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
c JULJE JLX JLXJSL XJ5 
SVXYl uK UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKK ) ss 
I, Susan Se Sprouse, do hereby certify that 
I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in 
and for the State of Utah? 
That as such Reporter, I attended the hearing 
of the foregoing matter and thereafter reported in Stenotype 
all of the testimony and proceedings had, and caused said 
notes to be transcribed into typewriting, and the foregoing 
pages numbered from 2 to 5 inclusive, constitute a full, 
true, and correct report of the same. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 23rd day of 
February, 19848 
Susan S. Sprouse, CSR/RPR 




ft. CLARK ARNOLD 
Lone t Arnold 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Valley Tower, Fourth Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephones (801) 521-5466 
IN THB THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COORT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATS OP OTAN 
RICHARD L. JAMBS, et ale, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vi, ) 
JOHN He DAVIES, et ai«, ) 
Defendants, ) 
vs. ) 
BAGLSY fc COMPANY, e t a l . , ) 
Third Party Defendants , ) 
rmoxMU OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAM 
Civil No. C-81-8560 
Assigned to Judge Daniels 
The above-entitled natter came on for hearing on Monday, 
January 9, 1984, at the hour of 10*00 a.m. Various of the plain* 
tiffs were present and were represented by '.heir attorney, R. 
Cflark Arnold. Mr. Arnold did not represent all of the plain-
tiffs, however, some of them representing themselves 
individually*. to wits Edwin Kirby, Dr. Charles Hagen, Keith 
Qurt, Stan and Patricia Tacy, Emily Tebbs, and Shoila Tondro. Of 
tne individual plaintiffs appearing pro oe, only Keith Gurr 
appeared representing himself. The defendants were present and 
represented by their attorney, Con Kostopulos. The trial con-
52/3-* Findings, Page 1 
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tinued until January 17, 1984* at which time botfe parties rested* 
During the course of the trial, both parties presented witnesses 
and submitted evidence in support of their respective positions. 
Upon the closing of this matter* the Court continued until 
February 10, and later continued until February 17, 19$4, closing 
arguments, in the interim* the parties submitted a Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in support of their respective positions. 
The matter having finally been closed* and the Court having con-
sidered all of the evidence presented* and being fully advised in 
the premises* now makes and entfr* the following finding of fsct 
and conclusions of law, 
FINDINGS Of FACT 
Findings with Regard to Jurisdiction of'venye 
1. The Court finds that the plaintiffs and defendants 
were residents of Salt Lake County* State of Utah. 
2. The Court finds that the property in dispute in this 
matter is situated in Salt Lake County* State of Utah. 
3. The Court findr that the Hi-Country Estates, Phase I 
Homeowners Association is a non-profit corporation organised 
under the laws of the State of Utah with its principal place of 
business being in Salt Lake County* Utah. 
4. All of the actions complained of in plaintiffs' 
Complaint and all actions complained of in defendants* 
Counterclaims occur ed in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Findings With Pegard to Plaintiffs* First Cause of Action 
5. With regard to the plaintiffs9 allegations in their 
first caus> of action regarding the election of Mr. Robert 
Millard as a director of the Homeowners Association at the 
October 15* 1980 special meeting, t*.e Court* finds that Mr. 
Millard was subsequently properly appointed and/or elected on at 
52/2-4 Findings, Page 2 
L 
least one occasion as a director of the Association and therefore 
the complaints raised in plaintiffs1 first cause of action are 
noot* 
6 The Court finds that plaintiffs1 have suffered no 
damages as a result of any alleged Improper election of Mr* 
Millard as a director at the October 15, 1980 special meeting. 
Findings With Regard to Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action 
7. With regard to the plaintiffs* second cause of 
action, the Court finds that John W, Davles9 Robert Millard and 
John C. Thomas, defendants herein, were properly elected as 
directors of the Homeowners Association and therefore the allega-
tions raised in the plaintiffs1 second cause of action are moot. 
8. The Court finds that the plaintiffs have suffered 
no damage as a result of any alleged improper election of Messrs 
Davies, Millard and Thomas at the February 28, 1981 annual 
meeting. 
Findings With Regard to Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action 
9. The Court finds that the Hi-Country Estates, Phase 
X Homeowners Association has taken action to enforce the protec-
tive covenants upon owners of property in Hi-Country Estates, 
Phase I, to witi filing various lawsuits, including a lawsuit 
against Shirlene and Richard James and has threatened to file 
lawsuits against other property owners. 
10. The Court finds that the Association has expended 
no funds in taking such act ion• 
11. The Court finds that the word "owner of property-
a s t h a t
 term is used in the protective covenants, was not 
Intended to include the homeowner *s association as an owner such 
as would gf)t(M»rf it to hrjgg action against another owner of 
property for violation of the covenants. 
52/2-4 Findings, Page 3 
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12* The Court finds that the purposes for which the 
Hi-Country Estates, Phase I Homeowners Association was incor~ / 
rated do not include enforcement of the protective covenants. 
137 The eourc—finds th*t unless mm Association is 
restrained and enjoined from enforcing the protective covenants, 
the plaintiffs will suffer injury for which they have no adequate 
remedy at law. 
Findings With Regard to Plaintiffs* Fourth Cause of Action 
14. The Court finds that protective covenants were 
recorded against the property located' in Bi-Country Estates, 
Phase I in two separate documents, both recorded on March 22, 
1974, to wits a basic set of covenants containing general 
restrictions and an amendment to that basic set of covenants. 
15. The Court finds that the basic set of covenants was 
executed on the date It bears, June 15» If70, 
16 The Court finds that the amendment to the covenants 
was executed on the date it bears, April 6, 1973. 
17. The Court finds that the basic set of covenants was 
prepared at a time when the grantor therein wan the equitable 
owner of the property located within Phase I. 
18. The Court finds that at the time the amendment to 
covenants was prepared, April 6, 1973, the purported grantor was 
not the equitable owner of a majority of the property located In 
Hi-County Estates Phase I. 
19. The Court finds t^ ar the protective covenants pre-
pared on June IS, 1970 are not vague or ambiguous in their con-
tent. 
2QO jhc Court finds that the covenaits^executed June 
li' **7Q bY their terms, prohibit amendment for a period of 
twenty-five years followinq their execution. 
21. The Court finds that the amendment dated April 6, 
197 3 w4sf intended to take effect immediately thereafter and~"~ • 
52/2-4 Pindings, Page 4 
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therefore sooner than 25 years after the execution of the basic 
covenants e "" ' ~" 
Findings with Pegard to Plaintiff?* Fifth Cause of Action 
22. The Court finds that the Articles of Incorporation 
of Hi-County Estates Phase i Homeowners Association do not 
include a specific grant of authority allowing the Association to 
appear at zoning hearings to represent the member3c 
21, The Court finds that the Articles of Incorporation 
of Hi-County Estates Pnase I Homeowners Association do not 
include as a purpose of the Association, acting in • represen-
tative capacity on behalf rf the members of the Association at 
zoning hearings* 
Findings with Regard to Platntlft3». Sixth Cause of Action 
24. The Court finds that the Articles of Incorporation 
and the Bylaws uf the Hi-County Estates Phasi 1 Homeowners 
Association do not provide * grant of authority for the directors 
to take action to enforce the protective covenants against owners 
of property in Hi-County Estates Phase I. 
IS The Court finds that the actions by directors In 
attempting n enforce the covenants In the une of the 
Association against property owners in Hi-County Estates Phase I, 
as found above, was ultra vires to the power of the Association. 
26c The Court finds that although the Association did 
take action in an att»»*npt to enforce the covenants against indi-
vidual property owners, no fjnds of the Association yfrf expended 
in doing so and therefore there has been no damage muffered by 
the Association by reason of sach actions* 
Findings With Regard to 0« fendant*' Counterclaims 
27, The Court •mda that the defendants voluntarily 
abandoned their counterciai*s against the plaintiffs without pre-
sent :ng evidence therecn. 
FCttdUnqs With a^gard to Attoin*ys* F*es 
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2i« The Court finds that both the plaintiffs and defen-
dants presented their various claims in this lawsuit in good 
faith and did so based upon a legitimate belief in the correct-
ness of their position. 
Findings With Regard To JoAnn Abplanalp. 
29 The Court finds that the only claims against the 
Defendant JoAnn Abplanalp involved the elections referenced in 
the Pirst and Second causes of action. Inasmuch as the court has 
found those to be moot, all claims against Abplanalp are also 
moot. 
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact# the Cc>f iict now 
enters the following conclusions of law. 
I Jurisdiction and venue are properly before this Court to 
hear the Plaintiff's and Defendant's complaints against each 
other and to render relief thereon. 
2« The plaintiffs* first rau^e or iti' tort should be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
3. The plaintiffs' second cause of net ion, should be 
dismissed with prejudice, 
4. The plaintiffs should be granted relief on their hie 3 
cause of action against the defendant Hi-Country Estates Phase I 
Homeowner's Association and the defendant directors thereof, and 
the Hi-County Estates Phase I Homeowners Association und Mm 
directors thoreof, in their capacity as directors, should be per-
manently restrained *nd enjoined from attempting to enforce the 
protective covenants. 
Se The defendants are entitled to n judgment by the Court 
declaring that the basic protective covenants executed on June 
IS, 1970 and recorded on March 22, 1974 are not vague or ambi-
guous and do constitute a present and continuing servitude upon 
52/2-4 findings. Page 6 
L 
the property located within Hi-County Estates Phase 1* however, 
the plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment of the Court declaring 
that the amendment to said protective covenants, prepared April 
6, 1973 and recorded March 22, 1974, was improperly enacted and 
is void, 
€o The plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment by the Court 
that the directors of the Homeowners Association are prohibited 
from representing the association oi members thereof at 
hearings and a permanent restraining order should Issue against 
the Association and directors thereof from participating In such 
hearings, 
7. The plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment toy the Com* 
that the defendants acted ultra vires In attempting to enforce 
the protective covenants against property owners in El-Country 
estates Phase I. The restraining order heretofore provided with 
regard to the plaintiffs * third cause of action should also be 
entered with regard to the sixth cause of action. No monetary 
damage should be awarded to plaintiffs on this cause of action. 
8 The defendants9 Counterclaims against the Defendants 
should ^e dismissed with prejudice, 
9. All claims against JoAnne > r.hould be dismissed 
with prejudice* 
10. Each party should bear their own icsti and attorney*9 
fees incurred herein. 
DATED this IX day of Marchf H1H 
SCOTT DANIELS 
District Judge 
A T - - : T 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENTt 
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R. CLARK ARNOLD 
Lowe & Arnold 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Valley Tower, Fourth Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-5466 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD L. JAMES, et al., ) 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. 
JOHN '* DAVIES, < al., 
Defendants, 
vs. 
BAGLEY & COMPANY, et al., 
Third Party Defendants. 
) J U D G M E N T 
| Civil No. C-81-8560 
i Assigned to Judge Daniels 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Monday, 
January 9, 1984, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. Various of the plain-
tiffs were present and were represented by their attorney, R. 
Clark Arnold. Mr. Arnold did not represent all of the plain-
tiffs, however, some of them representing themselves 
Individually; to wit: Edwin Kirby, Dr. Charles Hagen, Keith 
Gu2£; Stan and Patricia Tacy, Emily Tebbs, and Sheila Tondro. Of 
the individual plaintiffs appearing pro se, only Keith GUrr 
appeared representing himself. The defendants were present and 
represented by their attorney, Con Kostopulos. The trial coh-
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tinued until January 17, 1984, at which time both parties rested. 
During the course of the trial, both parties presented witnesses 
and submitted evidence in support of their respective positions. 
Upon the closing of this matter, the Court continued until 
February 10, and later continued until February 17, 1984, closing 
arguments. In the interim, the parties submitted Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in support of their respective positrons. 
The matter having finally been closed, and the Court having con-
sidered all of the evidence and memorandum presented, and being 
fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore signed and 
filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law, Now, there-
fore, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1, The plaintiffs" first cause of action is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
2. The plaintiffs1 second cause of action is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
3* The plaintiffs are hereby granted judgment against the 
dfefendants on their third cause of action, and the Defendant 
hdmeowners Association and the Directors thereof, individually in 
tfteir capacity as Directors, are hereby permanently restrained 
arid enjoined from taking action or expending funds of the 
Association to attempt to enforce the protective covenants 
agairidt property owners of property located in Hi-County Estates, 
Phase T. 
Ai The defendants are hereby granted a judgment against the 
plaintiffs on the plaintiffs' fourth cause of action to the 
extent that the Court hereby declares that the protective cove-
nants executed June 15, 1970 and recorded on March 22, 1974 to be 
valid and enforcible restrictions and servitudes on the property 
located in Hi-County Estates, Phase I. The plaintiffs, however-, 
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are hereby granted judgment against the defendants on said fourth 
cause of action to the extent that the Court hereby declares that 
the amendment to said protective covenants prepared April 6, 1973 
and recorded March 22, 1974, is void and unenforcible. 
5. The plaintiffs are hereby granted judgment against the 
defendants on their fifth cause of action and the Directors of 
the Hi-Country Estates Phase I Homeowners Association, in their 
capacity as directors are hereby permanently restrained and 
enjoined from appearing at Planning Commission or zoning meetings 
or hearings in a representative capacity on behalf of the asso-
ciation or of the individual property owners of property in 
Hi-County Estates, Phase !• 
6, The plaintiffs are hereby granted judgment against the 
defendants on their sixth cause of action and the Hi-Country 
Estates Phase I Homeowners Association and the Directors thereof, 
in their capacity as Directors, are hereby permanently restrained 
and enjoined from taking any action or expending any Association 
funds to enforce or attempt to enforce the protective covenants 
against property owners of property located in Hi-County Estates, 
Phase I. 
7. All claims against the Defendant JoAnn Abplanalp are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
86 The defendants having abandoned their counterclaims 
against the plaintiffs, the same are hereby dismissed with preju-
dice,, 
9e Each part is hereby ordered to assume their own costs 
arid attorneys1 fees incurred herein. 
DATED this ^ > day of March, 1984. 
SCOTT DANIELS 
District Judge 
„ /c ATT .'. 5 F 
**'* Judgment, Page 3 H. buONrv.-^/TY 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENTS 
/ • \ / 
Con /Kostopulos 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s 
4 
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ADDENDUM 7 
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION 
OF 
Hl-COUNTR Y ESTATES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION 
KNOW A J L Ml N IiY HIESF PRESENTS; 
I, t 1IAK1 ES E. LEWI ON, acting as the incorporator of a corpora-
lion unduj the Utah act governing the formation of non-profit corporal ion*, 
do luruby adopt the following Certif icate of Incorporation for such corpor-
al ion 
r iRST: The name of this Corporation is Hi-Country Estates Home-
owners Assoc ia t ion , he icaf ler cal led the " A s s o c i a t i o n . " 
SIICOND: The term of ex i s tence of this A s s o c latioA will be perpetual. 
THIRD: This Assoc ia t ion is not organised /or pecuniary profit or 
g u n to the m e m b e r s thereof, and the specif ic purposes for which it is 
lorui* d are to provide for maintenance, upkeep and preservat ion of the 
i »Uuih t (>4(U and common area w ilhin that certa in lr*cl of properly dc s»> r ib 
ed a s , 
Hi-Country Estate*,* located in Salt Lake County, 
Stale of Utah, Phase I, 
and also to include additional phases of Ht-Country Estate* and the home-
yNwurj. iocaii d within such additional subdivis ions as may be mutually bene-
Jtcial fcrr the m e m b e r s hereof and the homeowners of the adjoining sub-
d iv i s ions . J his Assoc ia t ion is a l so formed to promote ihe health, safety 
and Welfare of the res idents within H*-Country Estates and any additions 
thereto as may her*, after be bi ought within the jur isdict ion of this Assoc iat ion 
lor this purpose to: 
(a) L*crc ise all of the powers and pr iv i l eges and to perform 
all of the duties and obligations of the A s s o c i a t i o n as set forth in that c e r -
EVEKUTT E. D A H L 
AT T O R N C Y AT CAJ* 
/ a o C A S T c e n t r a fttffCCT 
( S W t t C • ) 
MIDVALS, UTAH 1 4 0 4 1 
E X H I B I T ^ 
l a i n P r o t e c t i v e Covcnantb for H l - C o u n t r y E s l a t e b , l o c a t e d m Sail Lake 
C o u n t y , bidic of Utah, P h a s e 2, a* a m e n d e d , w h i c h n> a p p l i c a b l e to thi 
p r o p e r t y , ami ab the b a m e m a y be a m e n d e d f r o m l i m e lo t i m e as. U K re in 
p r o s ided , 
(b) F I N , l^vy, c o l l c c l and e n f o r c e p a y m e n t by any lawful 
u i u u t h , al l t h 11 i:« » 01 a b b c i i b m e n l s pur buant to the tc rmb of t lu l J i o i » t -
U s e CuM' iun i s . , ab a m e n d e d , and a s p r o v i d e d in the B y - 1 awb adopted by 
i hu A bbot tat ion, to pa;/ al l expenfces in c o n n e c t ion I I K C I wi th %it^d a l l of f u v. 
and u l ln r e x p e n s e * inc ident to the c o n d u c t of the b o ^ m r b b of the A s s o c i a -
t i o n , i i i t l i id i i i^ a l l I ici use b, l u x e s o r g o v c m m * m 11 (• lui[ ' i , i . It v p d o t H U -
p«» i d a g a i n s t the prop* i l y of the AsbOi l a t i o n , 
(c ) / u t j i i i u by gi f t , p u i c h a b c o i olhi i wis i . o * n , hold , t m -
J T H V I , build upon, opt i a l e , m a i n t a i n , u i n v c y , b i l l kus<*, I r anstt r k dt -
•I u ». I » i o i p u b l it u . . o i o ' l i t i w i b i cj i b p o b i ( i f r t ! i<i [iv i 11 i . , t l | ) i i j | n i l , Hi 
i u tin ( i idii \ ii ii 11 i a)i.i M b of tin A n m I.I I i on 
(d) l'< i i "w m o n e y , a no w i th tin , IS^I ut u I t s u • I hi I d ^ of tin 
• in inbi i * i i i . i i i |Mj;i' , pU de.e, di'efl in 1i Ubt o r h> poi hi t a l e any or al l of it * 
t • a I . i pt i .dual pi OJM r ty ab s » \ u r i ly lor m o m y b« i row» d or dt bi » u < \> i t . H 
(e ) I K ii i« a t e , bi 11 o r 11 anbfe t a 11 o i . i n ; ji.tit ul ll>c VIMIHU II 
ai I a or l o a d b y b l e m to any publ ic a g e n c y , a u t h o i i t y , o i u t i l i t y lot bu«.h 
p u i p o b e b and s u b j e c t lo s u c h c o n d i i i o n b ab m a y be a g n c d to by the m u n i 
U rs», 
(f) P a r t i c i p a t e in m e r g e r b and c o n >ol id«i l ions w i t h othc r n o n -
prof i t c o r p o i a t i o n s o r g a n i z e d for the ba'mc p u r p o b e s or a n n e x a d d i t i o n a l 
i» ' .u ient ia l p i o p e r i ) , l o a d bysterrtb and c o m m o n a n a, lo t any c o n t i g u o u s 
a i e a b , 
(g) 1 I.ivc and lo e x e r c i f c e any and al l p o s \ e r b , r i g h t * ami 
p i t v i l c g e b w h i c h a c o i p o r a t i o n o r g a n i z e d u n d e r the N o n - P r o f i l C o r p o r a t i o n 
1 a a
 0 j [}, t. wsuu* of Utah m a y now or h e r e a f t e r have o r e ^ c r c t b e , 
(h) 1 he A s s o c i a t i o n s h a l l have no c a p i t a l s t o c k and no d i v i -
d e n d s o r o t h e r p e c u n i a r y p r o f i t s s h a l l be d e c l a r e d o r p a i d lo a n y m e m b e r 
o r d i r e c t o r of the A s s o c i a t i o n a s such*, 
(i) T h e A s s o c i a t i o n h a s no p o w e r to c a r r y on p r o p a g a n d a 
a t t e m p t lo i n l i n e nee l e g i s l a t i o n , o r t a k e p a r t in a p o l i t i c a l c a m p a i g n . 
K'vory p e r s o n o r e n t i t y w h o is a r e c o r d o w n e r of a fee o r u n d i v i d e d 
i n : i n t e r e s t in *ny Lot w i n c h i s s u b j e c t by c o v e n a n t s o r r e c o r d lo a i b t b s -
i n e n i by ihi* A s s o c i a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g p u r c h a s e r s u n d e r c o n t r a c t , s h a l l be a 
m e m b e r of t h e A s s o c i a t i o n . T h e f o r e g o i n g is not i n t e n d e d to i n c l u d e p e r -
i o n b o r e n t i t i e s w h o ho ld a n i n t e r e s t m e r e l y a s s e c u r i t y for the p e r f o r m a n c e 
ol a n o b l i g a t i o n , * u c h a s M o r t g a g e e s . M e m b e r s h i p s h a l l be a p p u r t e n a n t to 
.Hid m . iy not be s e p a r a t e d f r o m o w n e r s h i p of a n y lot whir l - , is s u b j e c t iu a a s e •..••-
m e n l by th«* A s s o c i a t i o n 
M e n . b e i . s :>h.tll he e n t i t l e d lo o n e v o l e for i a c h Lot u w n c d . A - l . u t 
.h . i l ! n i i ' a i i ,i,t) Lot ii» p l a t t e d a n d / o r d i v i d e d a s p r o v i d e d ;n the p . i-ti: 1.1 »v e 
- ' • • ' l u i i i i . '.'.'IK n i . ioi e t h a n one p e r s o n h o l d s a., u u e r e M »i» *i:>y Lo t , .ill 
n h p e r s o n s :• 1 »L oe . s s i i i . b i . r s . T h e v o t e l o r s u c h L . l s h a l l be c x t r n : . i . d 
a s l h e y . w n o / . } : ' J i e i i . : ' . ! I v e s d o t e r m 11 .••, b u t i n n o i . i i I . s h a l l m o r e t h a n o n e 
'. o i e i>c- c a s t A ill. i i ' i | A ' i i to a n y L o t , 
1 he - i l l . u r : . of th in A s s o c i a t i o n s h a l l be m a n a g e d by a b o . i z d of t h r e e 
L u e c t o r s , w Lo f .u 'd niit be m e m b e r s of t h e A s s o c i a t i o n . *1 he n u m b e r of 
l > . . e i t o r s m a y be c h a n g e d by a m e n d m e n t of t he B y - L a w s of the A s s o c i a t i o n . 
J :»e n a n t e s *ii\<\ a d d r e s s e s of t h e p e r s o n s w h o a r e to a c t in the c a p a c i t y of 
{ . M e n t o r * u n t i l t he j , e l e c t ion of t h e i r s u c c e s s o r s a r e : 
| ' a J i » r A d d r e s s 
t ' h a r l e u K. L a w i o n l \ O. Box 1901 
J a c k s u n , W y o m i n g 
K e u l i S p e n c e r C a s p e r , W y o m i n g 
T o n y M a b c a r o 4 5 0 5 W e s t 12600 S o u t h 
K i v c r l o n , U t a h 
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At the f i r s t annual m e e t i n g the m c m b c r i s h a l l e l e c t t h r e e D i r e c t o r * 
l or a t e r m of one y e a r , and at e a c h a n n u a l m e e t i n g t h e r e a f t e r the m e m b e r s ; 
.shall e l e c t the n u m b e r of D i r e c t o r s p r o v i d e d in the B y - L a w s for a t e r m of 
one yea r . 
I he A 6 hoc i.'it ion m a y be di s s o l v e d w i t h the a s s e n t g i v e n in wr it ing and 
.-. igned by nut l e s s than t w o - t h i r d s of a l l m e m b e r s ; p r o v i d e d , h o w e v e r , that 
ih.' as we i.-J m u s t lluin be d e d i c a t e d to an a p p r o p r i a t e publ ic a g e n c y to be u s e d 
lor p u r p o s e * s i m i l a r lo t h o s e for w h i c h t h i s A s s o c i a t i o n w a s c r e a t e d , or in 
ilu c v . n i that siu h d e d i c a t i o n is r e f u s e d a c c e p t a n c e , s u c h a s s e t s s h a l l be 
I'.i'iinii'd, c o n v e y e d and a s s i g n e d lo a n o n - p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n , a s s o c i a t i o n , 
i iu j . i >«r o ther orjj.i ur/at , ion to be d e v o t e d lo s u c h s i m i l a r p u r p o s e s . 
"1 lie .uhlre^i. of th i s A s s o c i a t i o n ' s r »•{.•; s l e red o f f u i in the L>.aie of 
• 1» ••• «: 1'. i ' . 1 •.»!>. 11, K i v e r t o n , Utah , ami the n a m e i>f u s r e e n t e r e d ai-cni 
.'."I h. :> a-ldret.t. .»,, i v c r e l l K. Ji.'ilil, A t t o r n e y at l a v . , 7ou Kaal C e n t e r S t r e e t , 
.MM Is ,i|, , thai , ;. ii) IV. 
A:.i«*n«lmi*ni ol t h i s ( e rl if >n at e s h a l l r e q u i r e the a s s e n t ul s e v e n i y -
I t . e p e r r e n ! «»| the e n i i r e m i ' m b c i s h i p . 
I he iiniiu and a d d r e s s of I In* liu'o r po r a l o r i s : (. h a r l e s K. I.rv.'tmi, 
!'.<.». IUi.\ l 'H) | , J.ii I .son, W y o m i n g . 
IN w n m ' S : ; WHKUKOK, 1 h a v e h e r e u n t o set m y hand tln> ,X' 
•day ui J a n u a r y , I V# V J. S 7 's 
Charles H. Lewton 
X 
••. A 11.' o r w i A H ) 
; s b , 
'. u t n i l y of S». It J a k . : ) 
J h e r e b y v e r t i l y that on the ? 0 day of J a n u a r y , \^'IL, CHAHLl. ' i 
V. LI W I O N , p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d b e f o r e m c , who b e i n g by m e f i r s t duly 
s w u m , d e c l a r e d that he is the p e r s o n w h o s i g n e d the f o r e g o i n g d o c u m e n t 
a s i n c o r p o r a t o r , and that the s t a t e m e n t s t h e r e i n c o n t a i n e d arc t r u e . 
- 4 - OGQ3G4 
WITNESS'my hand and notarial seal ^he day and year last above 
wri i len. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 




The name of the Association li Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association, 
hereinafter referred to *• the "Association." Tho principal of tics of the Association 
•hall be located at 13300 South 7370 Watt, Salt Lake City, Utah, but Meetings of members 
and directors amy be held at such places within or without the State pf Utah, as may be 
designated by the Board of Directors. 
ARTICLE II 
Definitions 
Section 1. "Association" shall wean and refer to Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Association, its successors end assigns. 
Section 2. "Properties" shell mean and refer to that curtain real property 
known aa Hi-Country Estates, located in Salt Lake County. State of Utah, Phase L, and 
such additions thereto aa caay hereafter be brought within the Jurisdiction of the 
Association, 
Section 3. "Coosaon Area" shall a*aa ell reel property owned by the Association 
for the common use and the cnjoyisent of the Owners, to include the road and street systesi, 
and the coosaon araaa uaed for mail delivery, garbage collection and school bus pickup. 
Section 4. ••Owner" shall Mean end refer to the record owner, whether one or 
•ore persons or entitles, of the fee simple title to any lot which is a part of the 
property, including persons or entities purchasing a lot under contract, but excluding 
thoae having such interest merciy,as security for the performance of an obligation. 
\% 
Section 5. "Protective Covenants" shell mean and refer to the Declaration of 
Protective Covenenta applicable to the property, as she same nay be aisended fromj:lmc 
to time. 
Section 6. "Member? shall mean and refer to those persons entitled to member-
ship as provided In the Protective Covenants, Certificate of Incorporation, and these 
By-Laws. 
ARTICLg III 
MEETING Of MEMBERS 
Section I. ANNUAL MEETINCS. the first annual meeting of the members shall be 
held within one year from the date of Incorporation of the Association, and each 
subsequent regular annual meeting of the cumbers shall be held on the same day of the 
same month of each year thereafter, at the hour of 8;00 o*clock P.M. If the day for the 
annual meeting of the member a Is a legal holiday, the meeting will be held at the same 
hour on the first day following which la not e legal holiday. 
Section 2. SPECIAL MEETINCS. Special meetings of dm members may be called at 
any time by the Preaident or by the Board of Directors, or upon written request by not 
ieaa than one-fourth of the members. 
Section 3. NOTICE OF MEETINCS. Written notice of each meeting of the members 
shall be given by, or at the direction of, the Secretary or peraon authorised to call the 
meeting, by mailing a copy of auch notice, postage prepaid, at least*fifteen deya before 
euch meeting to each member entitled to vote thereat, addressed to the member's address 
last appearing on the books of the Association or aupplied by auch member to the Association 
foe the purpose of notice. Such notice shell specify the place, day and hour of the meet-
ing, and, in the caae of a special meeting the purpose of the meeting. 
Section 4. QUORUM. The presence et the meetlug of members entitled to cast, 
in person or by proxy, one-tenth of the votes shall constitute a quorum for any action 
except aa otherwise provided in the Certificate of Incorporation or thcee By-Laws. If, 
however, such quorum shall not be present or represented at any meeting, the members 
entitled to vote thereat shall have power ro^adJourlTthe meeting from time to time, 
without notice other than announcement at the meeting, until e quorum as aforeseld shall 
be present or be represented. 
Section 5. PROXIES. At all meetings of members, each member may vote In person 
or by proxy. Ail proxies shall be in writing and filed with the Secretary. Every proxy 
ahall be revocable and shall automatically cease upon conveyance by the member of his lot. 
EXHIBIT &30306 
X l m Oireetere, we* »»#4 f*f »» • iwfcimti #* taw MAoerlaHoe. 
Section 2, TERM OF OfFXCI. Each Director ahali eerve A three-year term, none 
of which ahali bo concurrent. Thie WAS enacted to that on* Director would bo elected each 
year At cho Annual Moating, rapiacinA the outgoing Dlroecor vhoee tarai has expired, aa 
was oatAbllahod by amendment aa voted on by Coo *epbere in Cho Annual Ma a ting hold 
Occobor 23, 1915. 
Section 3. REMDVAL, Any Diractor may bo removed from cho Board, with or 
without cause» by A majority vota of too members of Cho Association. In the event of 
death, roaignaClon or removal of a Director* hla eucceesor ehail be elected by the 
remaining member a of Che Board and ahall eerve for Che unexpired term of hla predecessor. 
Section 4, COMPENSATION, No Director ahali receive compensation for any aervici 
he amy render to the Aaeoclation, However, any Director may be reimbursed for hla actual 
expensee incurred In the performance of hie dutiea. 
Section S. ACTION TAKEN WITHOUT A MEETING. The Directoraeheli have the right 
Co take any action In the abeeoce of A mooting which they could take at any meeting by 
obtaining che written approval of all cho Directora. Any action ao approved shall have 
Che same offeet aa chough taken AC A mMtlmfc of che Directors. 
ARTICLE V 
Nomination end Election of Directors 
Section 1, NOMINATION, Nomination for election to che Board of Dlreccora 
ahali be aiede by a Nominating Committee* aJomlnatione may alao be made froai che floor 
at Che annuel Meeting, The Nominating Committee ahali consist of*e Chairman, who shall 
be a member of the Board of Directora, and two or more membcra of the Aaaoclation, The 
Nominating Committee aheii be appointed by the <(oard of Dlreccora prior to each annual 
meeting of the membera, to aervc from the cioae of auch annual meeting until the close of 
the next annual meeting and auch appointment ahali be announced at each annual meeting. 
The Nominating Committee shall make aa many nominations for the Board of Directors as it 
shall, in lta discretion determine, but not leae Chan the number of vacancies chat are co 
be filled. Such nominations may be made from among members or non-members. 
Section 2, ELECTION Election to the Board of Directora ahali be by secret 
written ballot. At auch election the membera or their proxlce may case, in respect to 
eech vacancy, aa many votes aa they are entitled co exercise under the provisions of the 
Declaration, The persona receiving the iargeac number of voces shall be elected. 
Cumulative voting la not permitted, 
Hcctlnge of Dlreccora 
Secclon 1. REGULAR MEETINGS. Regular meetings of che Board of Directors shall 
be held monthly without notice, at auch place and hour aa may be fixed from time to time 
by resolution of the Board, Should aald meeting fall upon a legal holiday, then that 
meeting ehail be held at the same time on the next day which is not a legal holiday. 
Secclon 2. SPECIAL MEETINGS. Special meetings of the Board of Directors shall 
be held when called by che President of Che Aaaoclation, or by any two Dlreccora, after no 
leaa than three daya notice to each Director. 
Section 3. QUORUM. A majority*of the number of Directora ahali constitute 
a quorum for the transaction of buelneee. Every act or deciaion done or made by a 
majority of the Directora preaent at a duly held meeting at which a quorum la present 
shall be regarded aa the act of the Board, 
ARTICLE VII 
Powera and Duelea of the Board of Directora 
Section 1. POWERS, The Board of Directora ahali have power to: 
(a) Adopt and publlah mica and regular lone governing the uae of roada, 
atreeta, common area and facliltlca, gad the pereonAl conduct of the members and their 
gueata thereon, and co establish penalties for Che infraction thereof; 
(b) Suapend the voting rlghca and rlghc to uae of the recreational facilities o 
a member during any period in which auch members shall be in default in the payment of any 
assessment levied by tha Association. Such rlghca may also be auapended afcar notice and 
hearing, for a period not to exceed sixty days for infraction of published rules and 
retuUtton
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(a) Employ a manager, en independent contractor, or such othar employees aa they 
deem necessary, and to proscribe thair duties. 
Section 2. DUTIES. It shall ba the duty of tht Board of Directors to; 
(a) Cause to ba kept a complete record of all Its acts and corporate affairs 
and to present a statement thereofc to the members at the annual meeting of the members, 
or at any special meeting when such statement is requested in writing by not less than 
one-fourth of members who are entitled.to vote, 
(b) Supervise all officers, agents and employees of this Association, and to 
see that their duties are properly performed; 
(c) As more fully provided in the Protective Covenants, as amended, to: 
(i) Fix the amount of the annual assessment against each Lot at least 
thirty (30) days In advance of each annual assessment period; 
(2) Send written notice of each aasessment to every owner subject 
thereto at least thirty (30) days in advance of each annual assessment period; 
(3) Forclose the lien against any property for which assessments are 
not paid within thirty (30) days after due date or to bring an action at law 
againat the owner personally obligated to pay the tame. 
(d) Issue,' or to cause an appropriate officer to issue, upon demand by any 
person, a certificate setting forth whether or not ^ny assessment has been paid. j\ 
reasonable charge may be made by the Board for the issuance of such certificates. If 
a certificate states an assessment has been paid, such certificate shall be conclusive 
evidence of such payment; 
(e) Procure and maintain adequate liability and haaard insurance on property 
owned by the Association; 
(f) Cause all officers or employees having fiscal responsibilities to be 
bonded, AB die Board may deem appropriate; 
(g) Cause the common area and rood system to be maintained. 
ARTICLE VIII 
Officers and Their Duties 
Section 1. ENUMERATION OP OPPICEg. The officers of this Association shall by 
a President and Vice-President, who at all times will be members of the Board of Directors, 
a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such other officers as the Board nay from time to time by 
resolution create/ The Secretary end Treasurer may be the same person. 
Section 2. ELECTION OP OFFICERS, The election of officers shall Cake place at 
the first meeting of the Board of Directors following each annual meeting of the (members. 
Section 3. TERM. The officers of this Association »hall be elected annually by 
the Board and each shall hold office for one year unless he ahull sooner resign, or 
shall be removed, or otherwise disqualified to serve. 
Section 4. SPECIAL APPOINTMENTS. The Board may elect such other officers as 
the affairs of the Association may require, each of whom shall hold office for such period, 
have such authority, and perform such duties aa the Board may. from time to time, determine. 
Section 3. RESIGNATION AND REMOVAL. Any officer may be removed from office 
with or without cause by the Board. Any officer may resign at any tlise giving written 
notice to the Board, the President or the Secretary. Such resignation shall take effect 
on the date of receipt of such notice or at any, later time specified therein, and unless 
otherwise specified therein, the acceptance of such resignation shall not be necessary co 
make it effective. 
Section 8. DUTIES..Tha dutiat of the of Heart art %M follows: 
(a) PRESIDENT. The President shall pratIda at all Heatings of the Board of 
Directors, shall tee that orders and resolutions of the Board are carried out, thall sign 
ell leases, mortgagee, deeds and other written instrument* and thall co-sign ell check* 
and promissory notes* 
(b) VICE-PRESIDENT. The Vice-President shell ect in the piece end steed of 
the President In che event of hit absence, inability or refusal to ect, end shall exercise 
and discharge such other duties as may be required of hits by the Board. 
<c) SECRETARY. The Secretary shell record the votes and keep the minutes of 
ell meetings and proceedings of the Boerd and of the members; keep the corporate seel 
of the Association end affix it on ell papers requiring teld teal; terve notice ot 
meetings of the Board and of the members; keep appropriate current records showing members 
of the Association together with their addrettet, and thall perform such other duties as 
raquired by the Board. 
(<*) TREASURER. The Treasurer thall receive and deposit in appropriate bank 
accountt all monies of the Atsociatlon and thall disburse such funds as directed by 
resolution of the Board of Directors; thall co-tign ail checks and promissory notes of 
the Attociatlon; keep proper books of account; ceute aa annual audit of the Association 
books to be made by a Public Accountant at the completion of aach fiscal year; and shall 
prepare an annual budget and a statemene of income end expenditures to bo presented to the 
membership at itt regular annual meeting, end deliver a copy of each to the membert. 
ARTICLE IX 
Committana 
The Association shall have the right to eppoint members of the Architectural 
Control Committee, at provided In the Protective Covenants, at s&ch time et all Lott 
In the Trect have been told by the Grantor, ea stated in Protective Covenants. The 
Board shall alto have the right to appoint a Nominating Committee, as provided in these 
By-Laws, and in addition thereto shall eppoint other committees ad deemed appropriate in 
carrying out itt purposes. 
ARTICLE X 
Books and Records 
The books, records and papers of the Attocletion thall at all times, during 
reetonabie butlnest hours, be subject to inspection by any member. The Protective 
Covenants, Certificate of Incorporation and the By-Lawt of the Associetlon shall be 
available for inspection by any member et the principal office of the Attociatlon, where 
coplet may be purchased at reatoneble cost, 
ARTICLE XI 
Attettmentt 
At more fully provided In the Protective Covenants, at amended, each'member is 
obligated to pay to the Association annual and tpeclei attettmentt which are tecured by 
a continuing lien upon the property against which the etteatment Is made. Any assessments 
which arc not paid when due shall be delinquent. If the aeeessment is not paid within thirty 
(30) days after the due date, the attetttttnt thall bear interett from the date of 
delinquency at the rete of seven (7) percant per annuel, and the Atsociatlon may bring an 
action at law against the owner personally obligated to Rey the same or foreclose the 
lien against the property, and interest, coats, and reasonable attorney1s^fees of any' 
such action shall be edded to the amount of such assessment* No owner may waive or other-
wite etcape liability for the attetsment^provtoW^for hare to by non-use of the coemon 
eree, roads or abondoment of hit Lot. 
ARTICLE XII 
Corporate* Seal 
The Atsociatlon shall have a teal in circular form having within itt circumttance 
the wordt "Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Attociatlon.'1 
ARTICLE XIV 
Fiscal Year 
The fiscal year of the Association shall bagIn on the 1st day of January and 
and on the 3lst day of December of avary year,, except chat che first fiscal year shall 
begin on the date of Incorporation. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, We, being ail of the Directors of iii-Country Estate* 
Hosieowners Association, have hereunto set our hands this _ _ _ day of , 1976, 
HI-COUKTRY SSXAXXS HDMBOmWLS ASSOCIATION 
Bach Grantee and loc owner for h^iMalft hia hair*, executor*, and 
casigns, coyenanta and agreee to pay atu^ telly hia pro-rata abara of tha costs 
to maintain the roada, streets and comma** areas, including but not limited to, 
the common areaa set aside for the delivery and pickup of mail, tha pickup 
of children for school by school buses aed ether vehiclesf and an araa 
for garbage collection* Grantee1s*esssMffcapt in thi* ****** shall be paid 
promptly when the same bacomaa due eaprovided in the By-Laws of tha Homeowners 
Association, and the grantee's failure tfr p*y seme promptly when due shall 
constitute a lian upon the owner'e premises and tha aama may be enforced in 
equity or et law ea in the caae of any lien foreclosure. Such annual 
asaessment shall not commence until adoptioni and the first esseaement 
shall be in the amount of $(tp be determined) per lot owned, aaid amount 
to be placed in an account and to be'used exclusively by the Homeowner1s 
Association for the purpose herainabove mentioned, and for such other 
services as are deemed important to the development and preaervation of 
an attractive community and to further maintain the privacy and general 
aafaty of the residential communities located in Hi-Country Estates• 
Prom and after adoption, the annual payment may be increased each year up to 
five (5Z) percent of,the mavium* author!**** payment for the previous year. 
The Homeowners Association ia obligated tip provide palntenance and all" 
other services stated above only to the e*taat that such maintenance and 
services can be provided with the proceed*,ml auch annual payment*. Tha 
foregoing annual fee may be increased by ma amount greater than five 
percent (5X) of the maximum authorised payment for the previous year, by 
the written conaent of a majority of the lat owners. AC such time as any 
pu lie body shall undertake to maintain the reeds and ftreats and provide 
the other aervicea contemplated herein* this covenant shall ceeae, 
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SPECIAL WARRANTY DEiJfir 
^ 
ZIONH FIRST NATIONAL BANK. r. National Banking AsHoriotion, a* Trustee, of Salt 
Lake City, Utahf Ci-suitor, h^n:hy omvfyn u-*J warrant* against the act* of the Grantor only, 
to Steven K. Nesfieid and Suaao I . Ne*fieid t hia wife , aa Joiot.Ten«ntt «Uh« 
FUii Rights.of Survivorship 
Gran tec t 
for UKI aum of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDEItA. 
TION, the following described tract of land situated in SAW LUCE County. 
State'of VTAH 
?
MLot #91 , HI-COUNTRY ESTATES, a subdivision according Co the o U u l i l 
plat thereof recorded in tho o f f i c e of the County Mcordar of t t l i 
County, together with a right of way over and acroee the priveta tu«df, 
fc located within aaid tubdivliion.** 
at "Subject to the protective covenant a and the ar t i c l ea of the ho*»«owt,*r» 
asaociacion." 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor this ... l i e d ..„ day of ...- Juo*. 
19.. ?• h»o» cauaed thc*c present* to bo executed in ita corporate nam*, as trustee, u:.J under 
corporate *cal, as trustee, by two oi its Vic* Presidents hereunto duly authorized. 
" '** ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a 
National tion, as Trustee 
c Z* 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE \ ss-
On the ?3rd day of 
*>«U.A»AMfig 
sworn did nay they arc Vici 
elation, ami that said in*t 
luliofi of it* Hoard of Direc 
same, ns TroNtcv. 
Vie* President 
A.D. .lg74*.—f petionally approm! .*«f<'ro c*. 
t gndaraoow -..., who bu'u*£ \ >- i.o tiuw 
; National Bank, a National.*.*>•'/--: A.s.^. 
|!f of said Association, as Tn«<*.v, r^rt-^o-
to me that said Asaocuuiof.^.xt «-_:*< i C. 
'v^ ^Jj± jf P9***y Pubt«C^*. '-" 
-i-*** ll 
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H Oixcn Hu.diey, C%o< 3»d Dist. Court 
r ( - . Deputy Clark 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HI-COUNTRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN MAXFIELD, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-84-5500 
Before the Court are the respective positions of the parties 
dealing with disputed legal issues in this case. The parties 
requested, and the Court agreed that the disputed legal issues 
should be resolved by the Court at this stage of the proceedings, 
and govern the further processing of this dispute. The parties 
argued their respective positions orally to the Court, and have 
submitted extensive Memoranda. The Court, following argument, 
took the matter under advisement to further consider the 
Memoranda, exhibits attached thereto, and the positions of the 
parties. The Court has now considered the arguments and legal 
authorities of the parties, and being otherwise fully advised, 
enters the following Memorandum Decision. 
The principal dispute in this case is whether or not the 
plaintiff has the authority to make assessments against the 
defendants that relate to the operation of common areas within 
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the subdivision in question. The defendants take the position 
that the covenants that the plaintiff seeks to enforce have been 
declared invalid by Judge Scott Daniels1 ruling in the case of 
Richard L. James, et al. v. John W. Davis, et al.. Civil No. C-
81-8560. In that case Judge Daniels, among other matters, 
declared the 1973 amendments to the prospective covenants 
prepared April 6, 1973, and recorded March 22, 1974 were void and 
unenforceable. Plaintiff takes the position that neither the 
concept of res ajudicata or collateral estoppel apply, inasmuch 
as the basic issues before the Court in the so-called Davis case 
were substantially different. 
The Court is of the opinion that the defendants are 
mandatory members of the Association by virtue of their ownership 
of property within the subdivision in question. The Court is 
also of the opinion that the original concepts and covenants of 
the Homeowners Association carry with it not only the requirement 
of mandatory membership for property owners, but also the right 
to collect assessments on the part of the Homeowners Association 
for expenses related to areas of common usage and enjoyment. To 
the extent that the original covenants and agreements of the 
parties prior to the time of the voided amendments in accordance 
with Judge Daniels' Order do not provide for mandatory membership 
or the right to levy assessments for expenses on common ground 
the principle of "equitable servitude" applies. The defendants 
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enjoy the use of the common areas and other amenities held in 
common for the subdivision. The defendants1 statement that they 
do not want to use roadways, the electronically controlled gate, 
and other amenities is without merit. 
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, the Court determines 
under the circumstances of this case, that first, the Davis case 
does not constitute collateral estoppel or res ajudicata that 
would prohibit the plaintiffs from levying assessment against the 
defendants in this case. Secondly, the Court having determined 
that the principal of equitable servitude applies in this case, 
the plaintiff would be entitled to make reasonable assessments 
for the expenses related to the common areas, even if the 
original covenants and purposes of the Homeowners Association did 
not allow such an assessment. 
Finally, there being no dispute between the parties that a 
cause of action would exist for quantum merit, the plaintiffs 
likewise have that theory available to them, although because of 
the Court's determination of the disputed legal issues 
heretofore, the question of quantum meruit becomes moot. 
Counsel for the plaintiff is to prepare an appropriate Order 
in accordance with this Memorandum Decision governing the 
resolution of these disputed legal issues, and submit the same to 
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the Court for review and signature in/accordance with the Local 
Rules of Practice. 
Dated this / 7 day of/November, 1987. 
// 
CMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
.£ '7)- " 
, 'I*JK*** w i U r ^ 
i - -.> ^ r<b;<-i 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this // day of November, 1987s 
Robert A. Bentley 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 W, Broadway, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
R. Clark Arnold 
Attorney for Defendants 
455 South 300 East, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/r> 
•> *> «"^ . r** 
ADDENDUM 1 1 
ROBERT A. BENTLEY (0299) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, #1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-9085 
Salt Lake County Utah 
N O V - 4 1988 
H. Dixon Hindtoy. Clerk 3rd Dist. Court 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HI-COUNTRY HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation, 
Plaint i ff, 
vs 
STEVEN MAXFIELD, RICHARD JAMES, 
PAUL STROH and FRED KWIATKOWSKI, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. C84-5500 
Judge Timothy Hansen 
This matter came on for hearing on October 9, 1987 at 9:00 a.m. 
for argument on disputed legal issues before the Honorable Timothy 
Hanson, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiffs were represented 
by their attorney Robert A. Bentley and Defendants were represented 
by their counsel R, Clark Arnold* The parties having earlier pursuant 
to Order submitted Lists of Facts and Legal Issues, as well as 
memorandum in support thereof. The Court having heard the arguments 
of counsel, having read the pleadings and affidavits on file, together 
with the parties Memorandum of Points and Authorities and pursuant 
to the stipulation of counsel treating this matter as though it had 
come on for hearing on a motion for Summary Judgment, the Court 
having found that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the 
Court makes and enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of law: 
\ j s> 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
lo Plaintiff is a non-profit Corporation comprised of owners 
of real property located in the Hi-Country Estates Phase I subdivision 
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Entrance to the subject subdivision is possible at only one 
point which is fenced and controlled by an electronic security gate, 
one must know the combination which is periodically changed in order 
to gain access, lot size was restricted to five (5) acre rninimums. 
Over five miles of interior roads are improved and paved but remain 
private and owned by the Plaintiff having never been dedicated to 
Salt Lake County. 
3. Salt Lake County provides no services to the subdivision 
other than police and fire protection and the Plaintiff pursuant to 
its obligations under its Articles, Bylaws and Protective Covenants 
maintains the roads, provides snow removal, maintains the fence and 
electronic gate, disposes of garbage and other refuse, insures and 
adequate water supply and delivery system, and pays for legal fees 
incurred on issues of mutual benefit. 
4. The Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws for the Plaintiff 
Corporation are dated January 30, 19782 and were recorded by the 
original developer of the subdivision on May 17, 1973. The parties 
have stipulated that the wording of the Articles and Bylaws are not 
d i sputed . 
(a) The Articles state that the purpose of the Plaintiff 
assoc i a t i on is 
... for the maintenance, upkeep and preservation of 
the streets, roads and common area within that certain 
tract of property described ass Hi-Country Estates, 
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Phase 
I,,.. The Association is also formed to promote the 
health safety and welfare of the residents within Hi-
Count ry Estates... 
(b) The Articles further state that: 
Every person or entity who is a record owner of a fee 
or undivided fee interest in any Lot which is subject 
by covenants or record to assessment by the 
Association, including purchasers under contract, 
shall be a member of the Association... Membersh ip 
shall be appurtenant to and may not be separated from 
ownership of any lot which is subject to assessment 
by the Association."(Emphasis added) 
(c) The Articles charge the Association with the duty to: 
(a) Exercise all of the powers and privileges and 
to perform all of the duties and obligations of the 
Association as set forth in that certain Protective 
Covenants for Hi-Country estates..., (b) Fix, levy, 
collect and enforce payment by any lawful means, all 
charges or assessments pursuant to the terms of the 
Protective Covenants, as amended, and as provided in 
the By-laws adopted by the Association; to pay all 
expenses in connection therewith and all office and 
other expenses incident to the conduct of the business 
of the Association, including all licenses, taxes or 
governmental charges levied or imposed against the 
property of the Association. 
5o The Bylaws of the Association charge the Association Board 
of Directors with the following duties: 
(c) As more fully provided in the Protective 
Covenants, as amended, to: 
(1) Fix the amount of the annual 
assessment against each Lot at least thirty (30) days 
in advance of each annual assessment period; 
(2) Send written notice of each 
assessment to every owner subject thereto at least 
thirty (30) days in advance of each annual assessment 
pe r i od; 
(3) Foreclose the lien against any 
property for which assessments are not paid within 
thirty (30) days after due date or to bring an action 
at law against the owner personally obligated to pay 
the same. 
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6c The Bylaws of the Association further state in Article XI 
as follows? 
As more fully provided in the Protective 
Covenants, as amended, each member is obligated to 
pay to the Association annual and special assessments 
which are secured by a continuing lien upon the 
property against which the assessment is made. Any 
assessments which are not paid when due shall be 
delinquent. If the assessment is not paid within 
thirty (30) days after the due date, the assessment 
shall bear interest form the date of delinquency at 
the rate of seven (7) percent per annum, and the 
Association may bring an action at law against the 
owner personally obi igated to pay the same or foreclose 
the lien against the property,m and interest, costs, 
and reasonable attorneys fees of any such action shall 
be added to the amount of such assessment. No owner 
may waive or otherwise escape liability for the 
assessment provided for herein by non-use of thTe 
common area, roads or abandonment of his lot. (Emphasis 
added) 
7. Each of the Defendants is a recorded owner of one or more 
parcel of real property located within said subdivision. 
8. The Property deeds of Defendants Maxfield, Kwiatkowski and 
James make their ownership interest "subject to the Protective 
Covenants and articles of the Homeowners Association." Further 
Defendant James has in the past served as President of the Plaintiff 
Corporat ion. 
9. Plaintiff as required by the Articles and Bylaws imposes an 
annual assessment upon lot owners of record for the services it 
provides. Said assessments are due the first of each year and were 
$115 per year for each year period to 1986, $120 for 1986 and 1987 
and $125 in 1988 c In addition since 1985 there has been a garbage 
collection assessment of $48 imposed on all lot owners. 
10. The Defendants enjoy and use the services and common areas 
own, held, maintained and provided by the Plaintiff. The Defendants 
allegation that they do not want to use such services is transparent 
and without merit* The Association Bylaws provide that ?? No owner 
may waive or otherwise escape liability for the assessments provided 
for herein by non-use of the common area, roads or abandonment of 
his lot." 
11. Defendants have conceded and stipulated that for at least 
a period of time after acquiring their property the Defendants were 
members of the Association and paid their assessments. 
12o In late 1981 the Defendants herein, along with several other 
homeowners filed suit against the Plaintiff here in theThird District 
Count in and for Salt Lake Country, State of Utah in the case of 
James, et al. v. Davis, et al, Civil No. C-81-8560. Said action 
sought to invalidate the election of certain individuals as Directors 
of the Association, to enjoin the enforcement of both the original 
and Amended Protective Covenants by the Plaintiff, and to further 
enjoin the Plaintiff herein from appearing at zoning hearings. 
13. Defendants herein, (Plaintiffs therein), alleged and 
admitted in that Complaint that they were in fact members of the 
association and that the association was formed for the purpose of 
maintaining and providing for common areas which all lot owners used 
and enjoyed. 
14. The issues in the Dav i s case is not identical with the 
ones presented in this action. The ability of the Plaintiff 
Association, (Defendant therein) to levy, lien, assess and or 
collect annual assessments was not raised by any of the parties 
there in. 
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15c The Court in Davi s held the original Protective Covenants 
relied in part on by Plaintiffs herein constituted a present and 
continuing servitude upon the property. The Amended Protective 
Covenants invalidated therein by the Court were not cited or relied 
upon by Plaintiff in seeking judgment herein. 
16c The Court in Dav i s was not asked nor did not it consider 
whether lot owners would be liable for homeowners assessments or 
whether membership in the Association could be considered mandatory 
on some basis other than the Amended Protective Covenants. 
17. Subsequent to the Courts decision in Da v i s, each of the 
Defendants herein notified the Plaintiff that they were withdrawing 
from membership in the association and would no longer consider 
themselves to be liable for annual assessments. 
18. Defendant Steven Maxfield has failed to pay his assessments 
and charges of record and is now delinquent as of July 31, 1988 in 
the amount of $1,177.99. 
19. Defendant Fred Kwiatkowski has failed to pay his assessments 
of record and is now delinquent as of July 31, 1988 in the amount 
of $982.36. 
20. Defendant Richard James has failed to pay his assessments 
of record and is now delinquent as of July 31, 1988 in the amount 
of $886.93 
21. Defendant Paul Stroh has failed to pay is assessments of 
record and is now delinquent as of July 31, 1988 in the amount of 
$1,010. 13 
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22. The Plaintiff has incurred $3,260 in attorneys fees in 
prosecuting this action and the Court finds said amount to be 
reasonable. Said fees can not be reasonable apportioned between 
individual defendants as the individual defendants were joined for 
the purpose of this appeal form a Small Claims Court Judgment. 
23. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has necessarily incurred 
the following costs in the maintenance of this action and that such 
costs in conformance with Plaintiffs memorandum to Tax Costs should 
be assessed against the Defendants respectively as follows: STEVE 
MAXFIELD $12.50, RICHARD JAMES $36.75, PAUL STROH $36.75, and FRED 
KWIATKOWSKI $2 5. 
From the foregoing the Court makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Jurisdiction and venue are properly before this Court to 
hear this cause of action and to render relief therein. 
2. Defendants by virtue of their past actions, conduct and 
admissions are estopped from denying that they are members of the 
Plaintiff association or that they are not liable for Association 
assessments. 
3. Defendants are mandatory members of the Plaint iff Association 
by virtue of their ownership of property in the subdivision and can 
not unilaterally resign from membership or escape liability for 
assessments. 
4. The Plaintiff association is legally and lawfully entitled 
to levy and collect assessments from lot owners for expenses incurred 
by the Plaintiff in discharging its duties under the Articles, Bylaws 
and Protective Covenant. 
- 7 -
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5 . The Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and original Protect ive 
Covenants of the Plaintiff Association constitute a present and 
continuing equitable servitude upon the property owned by the 
de fendant s. 
60 Plaintiffs cause of action against Defendants is not barred 
by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel* 
7. The past assessments imposed by the Plaintiff are just and 
reasonable and each lot owner is liable for the amount assessed for 
each yeare 
8«, Defendants are indebted to Plaintiff and Plaintiff is entitled 
to judgments against Defendants in the following amounts together 
with interest thereon from July 31, 1988 at the rate of 12%: 
(a) Steven Maxfield $1177.99 
(b) Fred Kwiatkowski $982.36 
(c) Richard James $886.93 
(d) Paul Stroh $1,010.13 
9. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys fees against 
the Defendants individually and severally in the amount of $3,260 
10, Counts I and II of Defendants Counterclaims are hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. Count III of Defendants Counterclaim is 
dismissed without prejudice and Defendants are granted leave to 
refile said Counterclaim as an Order to/Show Cause in the Dav i s case. 
DATED this £ dav of -Qcrtobor.* 19 88. 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, first class, postage prepaid a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law to R. Clark Arnold, PARSON AND CROWTHER, 455 South 300 East, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 and Steven K. Maxfield 3329 South 500 West, 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
n 
HI-COUNTRY HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation, 
^^7 
'7 
Plaint i ff, 
vs 
STEVEN MAXFIELD, RICHARD JAMES, 
PAUL STROH and FRED KWIATKOWSKI, 
De fendan t s . 
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JUDGMENT 
Case No. C84-5500 
Judge Timothy Hansen 
This matter came on for hearing on October 9, 1987 at 9:00 a.m. 
for argument on disputed legal issues before the Honorable Timothy 
Hanson, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiffs were represented 
by their attorney Robert A. Bentley and Defendants were represented 
by their counsel Re Clark Arnold. The Court having read the memorandum 
of the parties, having heard the arguments of counsel and treating 
this matter as a motion for Summary Judgment and for other good cause: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE as follows: 
1. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant Steven Maxfield in the principle sum of $1,177.99 as of 
July 31, 1988, costs of $12.50, for at total Judgment amount of 
$1190.49 with interest thereon from date at the rate of 12% per 
annum, plus Judgment for attorneys fees as entered herein below. 
2. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant Fred Kwaitkwoski in the principle sum of $982.36 as of 
.- wT 
July 31, 1988, costs of $25.00, for a total Judgment amount of 
$1,007.39, together with interest thereon from date at the rate of 
12% per annum, plus Judgment for attorneys fees as entered herein 
be low* 
3. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant Paul Stroh in the principle sum of $1,010.13 as of July 
31, 1988, costs of $36.75 for a total Judgment amount of $1046.88, 
together with interest thereon from date at the rate of 12%, plus 
Judgment for attorneys fees as entered herein below. 
4. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant Richard James in the principle sum of $886.93 as of July 
31, 1988, costs of $24.25, for a total Judgment amount of $911.18 
together with interest thereon from date at the rate of 12%, plus 
Judgment for attorneys fees as entered herein below. 
5. Judgment is further entered in favor of Plaintiff and against 
the Defendants jointly and severally in the sum of $3,260.00 
representing a reasonable attorneys fee incurred by Plaintiff in 
defending this matter. 
6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to release and pay to 
the Plaintiff the appeal bonds posted/by the Defendants herein 
DATED this & day of Pot oho/, 1&8 8 
ICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
[£:< <-<•<'•'-*: 
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I hereby certify that I mailed, first class, postage prepaid a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment to R, Clark Arnold, 
PARSON AND CROWTHER, 45 5 South 300 Eas t , Sa 11 Lake Ci ty, UT 84111 and 
to Steven K. Maxfield 3329 South 500 West Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
on this day of October, 1988. 
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